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Abstract
The International Health Regulations (ihr), of which the World Health Organization is 
custodian, govern how countries collectively promote global health security, including 
prevention, detection, and response to global health emergencies such as the ongoing 
covid-19 pandemic. Countries are permitted to exercise their sovereignty in taking 
additional health measures to respond to such emergencies if these measures adhere 
to Article 43 of this legally binding instrument. Overbroad measures taken during re-
cent public health emergencies of international concern, however, reveal that the pro-
vision remains inadequately understood. A shared understanding of the measures le-
gally permitted by Article 43 is a necessary step in ensuring the fulfillment of 
obligations, and fostering global solidarity and resilience in the face of future pandem-
ics. In this consensus statement, public international law scholars specializing in glob-
al health consider the legal meaning of Article 43 using the interpretive framework of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Keywords
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – International Health Regulations –  
international organizations – World Health Organization – global health law –  
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1 Introduction
This article contains the first of two consensus statements that apply generally 
accepted principles and doctrine of public international law to interpret coun-
tries’ legal obligations under the International Health Regulations (ihr). This 
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first statement clarifies what additional health measures countries can legally 
enact under Article 43 of the ihr when responding to public health events.
International travel connects countries and people around the world more 
than ever before.1 This global interconnectedness has also hastened the inter-
national spread of infectious diseases, including prominent recent outbreaks 
like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (sars) in 2003, H1N1 influenza in 
2009, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (mers) in 2012, Ebola in 2014, Zika 
in 2016, Ebola again in 2018, and most recently, novel coronavirus (covid-19) 
in 2020.2 As the directing and coordinating authority on international health 
work,3 the World Health Organization (who) administers the legally binding 
International Health Regulations (ihr), which aim to “prevent, protect against, 
control and provide a public health response to the international spread of 
disease” while avoiding “unnecessary interference with international traffic 
and trade.”4 One hundred and ninety-six states have accepted the ihr, high-
lighting  universal recognition for the need to cooperate across borders in pre-
venting the spread of infectious diseases in a globalized world.5
The ihr are the product of over 150 years of multilateral efforts to contain 
the international spread of infectious diseases while preserving economic 
flourishment and trade.6 Its precursors, a series of political agreements and 
international conventions and regulations between 1851 and 1944, saw Euro-
pean powers and other states agreeing to standardize international quarantine 
regulations against the spread of specific diseases such as cholera, plague and 
yellow fever.7 The raison d’être of these early attempts at global health security 
1 Steven J Hoffman and Clarke B Cole, ‘Defining the global health system and systematically 
mapping its network of actors’ (2018) 14(1) Globalization and Health 38.
2 Lawrence O Gostin and Rebecca Katz, ‘The International Health Regulations: The Governing 
Framework for Global Health Security’ (2016) 94(2) Milbank quarterly 264, 273; Belinda Ben-
nett and Terry Carney, ‘Public Health Emergencies of International Concern: Global, Region-
al, and Local Responses to Risk’ (2017) 25(2) Medical Law Review 223, 224.
3 Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature 22 July 1946, 14 unts 185 
(entered into force 7 April 1948) art 2(a) (‘who Constitution’).
4 World Health Organization (‘who’), World Health Assembly, Revisions of the International 
Health Regulations Res, wha58.3, 58th assembly, 23 May 2005, art 2 <https://www.who.int/
ipcs/publications/wha/ihr_resolution.pdf> (‘ihr’).
5 Steven J Hoffman, ‘How Many People Must Die from Pandemics before the World Learns?’ 
(2017) 1(1) Global challenges 30.
6 Steven J Hoffman, ‘The Evolution, Etiology and Eventualities of the Global Health Security 
Regime’ (2010) 25(6) Health policy and planning 510.
7 Adam Kamradt-Scott and Simon Rushton, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations: 
Socialization, Compliance and Changing Norms of Global Health Security’ (2012) 24(1) Glob-
al Change, Peace & Security 57, 58.
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governance was to protect against public health threats8 while minimizing dis-
ruptions to trade and travel – a balance that remains at the core of the ihr to 
this day.9
The previous century’s efforts to draft a more comprehensive interna-
tional legal agreement on state responses to public health risks gained mo-
mentum with the creation of who in 1948 as a specialized agency of the 
United Nations (UN). Article 21 of the who Constitution empowers the 
agency’s plenary governing body – the World Health Assembly (wha) – to 
adopt legally binding regulations by majority vote concerning “sanitary and 
quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the 
international spread of disease.”10 Exercising this authority, the wha ad-
opted in 1951 the International Sanitary Regulations (isr), 11 which was re-
vised and renamed in 1969 the International Health Regulations or ihr  
(1969).12
The ihr (1969) remained limited in scope, however, dealing only with 
the spread of a limited set of diseases, including plague, cholera, yellow fe-
ver and smallpox until its eradication in the late 1970s. Critics denounced 
the poor  record of state compliance with its provisions, including states’ 
continued application of excessive health measures beyond those pre-
scribed by the regulations.13 In response to these shortcomings, in 1995, the 
wha launched a process to revise the ihr (1969).14 Accelerated by the sars 
 outbreak in 2003,  negotiations concluded with the adoption by consensus of 
8 Gostin and Katz, above n 2, 266.
9 Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, above n 7, 58.
10 who Constitution, above n 3, art 21.
11 who, World Health Assembly, Adoption of the International Sanitary Regulations (who 
Regulations No. 2), wha4.75, 4th assembly, 25 May 1951 in Handbook of Resolutions and 
Decisions of the World Health Assembly and the Executive Board – Volume i <https://apps 
.who.int/iris/handle/10665/79012>.
12 who, World Health Assembly, International Health Regulations, wha22.46, 22nd assem-
bly, 25 July 1969 in Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly 
and the Executive Board – Volume i <https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/79012>.
13 Barbara von Tigerstrom, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations and Restraint of 
National Health Measures’ (2005) 13 Health Law Journal 35, 37, 43.
14 who, World Health Assembly, Revision and updating of the International Health Regula-
tions, wha48.7, 48th assembly, 12 May 1995 in Forty-Eighth World Health Assembly Summa-
ry Records and Reports of Committees <https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/178304>.
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a revised ihr by the wha on 23 May 2005, that entered into force on 15 June 
2007.15
From an international law perspective, the revised ihr went a long way to-
ward more precisely articulating what measures states are legally allowed to 
implement when addressing public health risks. Clear rules are important be-
cause many of the public health measures typically implemented in response 
to outbreaks – such as government-imposed quarantines, cordon sanitaires, 
trade restrictions, and travel bans – could have significant deleterious effects 
on other countries and on those other countries’ inhabitants. Generally, states 
are expected to limit their responses to actions foreseen by the ihr or formally 
recommended by the who. However, Article 43 of the revised ihr allows 
states to implement additional health measures, but only if they achieve the 
same or greater levels of health protection than recommendations issued by 
the who16 or health measures otherwise prohibited by specific articles of the 
ihr,17 and only if certain conditions are met and the health measure is re-
ported to the who.
Experience across six public health emergencies of international concern 
(pheics), including the ongoing global struggle against the covid-19 pandem-
ic, demonstrate that consensus on the scope and interpretation of  Article 43 – 
i.e., on what states can legally do when responding to public health risks  – 
remains elusive. This is owing in part to a lack of coherence in the way that 
additional health measures have been monitored by the who since the ihr’s 
inception.18 It may also be the result of a general lack of familiarity among 
states with the requirements of Article 43. For instance, when approached by 
the who to provide justifications for the additional health measures adopted 
during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, some states responded that their 
measures were not “health-related” and therefore (incorrectly) concluded 
those measures were not governed by the ihr.19
On 26 May 2018, the wha approved a five-year global strategic plan (2018–
2023) to improve the global response to the international spread of disease, 
15 ihr, above n 4.
16 Ibid art 43(1)(a).
17 Ibid art 43(1)(b).
18 who, Regional Committee of who for the Americas, Implementation of the International 
Health Regulations (ihr), who Doc cd55/12, 68th sess, rev 1, 16 September 2016 <https://
www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2016/CD55-12-e.pdf>.
19 who, World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005): Report of the Review Committee on the Role of the International Health Regula-
tions (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and Response (Report by the Director-General), who Doc 
A69/21, 69th sess, 13 May 2017 [72] <https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA69/
A69_21-en.pdf> (‘Ebola Review Committee Report’).
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Box 1 ihr Article 43 – Additional Health Measures
1. These Regulations shall not preclude States Parties from implementing 
health measures, in accordance with their relevant national law and obli-
gations under international law, in response to specific public health risks 
or public health emergencies of international concern, which:
(a) achieve the same or greater level of health protection than who rec-
ommendations; or
(b) are otherwise prohibited under Article 25, Article 26, paragraphs 1 
and 2 of Article 28, Article 30, paragraph 1(c) of Article 31 and Article 
33, 
provided such measures are otherwise consistent with these Regulations.
Such measures shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and not 
more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alterna-
tives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection.
2. In determining whether to implement the health measures referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article or additional health measures under paragraph 
2 of Article 23, paragraph 1 of Article 27, paragraph 2 of Article 28 and para-
graph 2(c) of Article 31, States Parties shall base their determinations upon:
(a) scientific principles;
(b) available scientific evidence of a risk to human health, or where such 
evidence is insufficient, the available information including from 
who and other relevant intergovernmental organizations and inter-
national bodies; and
(c) any available specific guidance or advice from who.
3. A State Party implementing additional health measures referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article which significantly interfere with international 
traffic shall provide to who the public health rationale and relevant scien-
tific information for it. who shall share this information with other States 
Parties and shall share information regarding the health measures imple-
mented. For the purpose of this Article, significant interference generally 
means refusal of entry or departure of international travellers, baggage, 
cargo, containers, conveyances, goods, and the like, or their delay, for more 
than 24 hours.
4. After assessing information provided pursuant to paragraph 3 and 5 of this 
Article and other relevant information, who may request that the State 
Party concerned reconsider the application of the measures.
5. A State Party implementing additional health measures referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article that significantly interfere with interna-
tional traffic shall inform who, within 48 hours of implementation, of 
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such measures and their health rationale unless these are covered by a 
temporary or standing recommendation.
6. A State Party implementing a health measure pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2 
of this Article shall within three months review such a measure taking into 
account the advice of who and the criteria in paragraph 2 of this Article.
7. Without prejudice to its rights under Article 56, any State Party impacted 
by a measure taken pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article may request 
the State Party implementing such a measure to consult with it. The pur-
pose of such consultations is to clarify the scientific information and pub-
lic health rationale underlying the measure and to find a mutually accept-
able solution.
8. The provisions of this Article may apply to implementation of measures 
concerning travellers taking part in mass congregations.
including by improving the implementation of the ihr (2005).20 The plan pro-
poses a pillar of action centred on “[s]trengthening event management and 
compliance with the requirements under the  International Health Regulations 
(2005).”21 In particular, the plan notes that state compliance with the ihr in 
relation to additional health measures is a “critical element for the optimal 
functioning of the global alert and response system.”22 Clarity on the exact ob-
ligations that are enshrined in Article 43 is a necessary first (albeit insufficient) 
step to achieving such compliance. Indeed, without such clarity, it is impossi-
ble for states to know what they are allowed to do under the ihr when the next 
inevitable infectious disease outbreak occurs and it would be impossible for 
governments, international institutions, judicial bodies, and the public to 
judge whether those states are in compliance with their international legal 
obligations.
To provide this clarity, public international law scholars specializing in glob-
al health were systematically identified and convened to collectively apply the 
interpretive framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to the 
20 who, World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005): five-year global strategic plan to improve public health preparedness and response, 
2018–2023, wha71(15), 71st sess, 26 May 2018 [22–23] in Seventy-First World Health Assem-
bly Resolutions and Decisions Annexes <https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA71 
-REC1/A71_2018_REC1-en.pdf#page=1> (‘wha Decision 71(15)’.
21 who, World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005) (Report by the Director-General), who Doc A71/8, 71st sess, 11 April 2018 <https://
apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA71/A71_8-en.pdf>.
22 Ibid [22].
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ihr, reach a jurisprudential consensus23 on the legal meaning of Article 43, 
and author this consensus statement. Twenty scholars were found to meet the 
following five criteria, and were invited to a consensus conference: 1) public 
international law scholar; 2) qualified as a lawyer or appointed as a full-time 
core faculty at a law school; 3) focus at least half of one’s scholarly activities on 
global health; 4) author of relevant peer-reviewed articles published within the 
last five years; and 5) independent of other scholars, supervisors, governments, 
and other directive entities. Fourteen scholars participated in the conference, 
held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, April 8–10, 2019, supported by two research 
fellows (rh/mc) and funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research 
and the Research Council of Norway. This “Stellenbosch Consensus” statement 
details the participating group’s methodology and legal interpretation of Arti-
cle 43 of the ihr. Ultimately, the hope is that greater clarity about the exact 
legal obligations created by the ihr’s Article 43 might serve as a starting point 
for promoting greater compliance with them, for informing possible future re-




In this consensus statement, Article 43 of the ihr is interpreted according to 
the rules of interpretation laid out in Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties.24 Although the rules of the Vienna Convention do 
not represent an exhaustive compilation of guidance on the interpretation of 
international agreements, they are widely regarded as having general applica-
bility to the interpretation of international legal instruments as an expression 
of accepted principles and practices, including instruments like the ihr.25 
Support for this latter conclusion can be found under Article 5 of the Vienna 
Convention, which stipulates that “the Convention applies…to any treaty 
23 The Oxford Dictionary of Law defines “jurisprudence” as: “[t]he theoretical analysis of 
legal issues at the highest level of abstraction. Jurisprudence may be distinguished from 
both legal theory and the philosophy of law by its concern with those questions (e.g. 
about the nature of a particular right or duty, or a particular line of judicial reasoning) 
that arise within or are implied by substantive legal disciplines.” See Jonathan Law, The 
Oxford Dictionary of Law (9th ed, 2018) sub verbo “jurisprudence”.
24 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 unts 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980) (‘Vienna Convention’).
25 Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 7 (2nd ed, 2015).
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 adopted within an international organization without prejudice to any rele-
vant rules of the organization.”26 While the ihr is not referred to as a “treaty” 
by the who or its parties, the Vienna Convention was nonetheless applied here 
because it is the most authoritative framework for interpreting all types of 
written international law instruments no matter their name or label.
Regulations adopted under Article 21 of the who Constitution become le-
gally binding on all 194 who member states unless a state rejects them (or 
files a reservation subject to a procedure spelled out in Article 53) within 18 
months from the date of notification.27 Since no state party had sought to opt 
out of the revised ihr before its entry into force, the ihr is binding on all these 
states, with two additional states, the Holy See and Liechtenstein, acceding 
subsequently.
The degree to which states understood the ihr to create reciprocal legal 
obligations subject to the Vienna Convention is further illustrated by the re-
sponses that emerged from reservations to the regulations. For example, speak-
ing on behalf of 27 member states, Portugal, as then-President of the Council 
of the European Union, recalled the principle set out in Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention that “a Party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform its international obligations” and con-
cluded that federal governments would be expected to “exercise every effort to 
ensure that the provisions of the ihr are fully implemented and given full ef-
fect by the pertinent authorities.”28
2.2 Interpretive Approach
The UN International Law Commission (ilc) has previously advised that the 
interpretation of a treaty should consist of “a single combined operation, 
which places appropriate emphasis on the various means of interpretation in-
dicated, respectively, in Articles 31 [general rule of interpretation] and 32 [sup-
plementary means of interpretation]” of the Vienna Convention.29
This consensus statement interprets Article 43 of the ihr using the ele-
ments of the Vienna Convention’s general rule of interpretation.30 These 
 elements include (a) the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in 
26 ihr, above n 4, art 5.
27 who Constitution, above n 3, art 22 ; ihr, above n 4, art 59(1).
28 ihr, above n 4, appendix 2.
29 General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission, UN gaor, 73rd sess, Supp 
No 10, UN Doc A/73/10 (30 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2018) 13 (‘ilc Study on Subse-
quent Agreements and Subsequent Practice’).
30 This analysis omits the following components of the general rule of interpretation which 
do not apply (or exist) as a useful source of interpretation for the ihr: Article 31(2)(b) Any 
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their context and in light of its object and purpose, as well as wha resolution 
58.3 of 23 May 2005, which qualifies as an agreement relating to – and made by 
all parties in connection with – the conclusion of the ihr31 (Section 3); 
(b) subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation (Section 4); and (c) any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties (Section 5).
Where the meanings resulting from this application of the general rule 
 require confirmation or clarification, recourse is also made to the Vienna Con-
vention’s supplementary means of treaty interpretation.
2.2.1 General Rule of Interpretation: Ordinary Meaning
As a starting point, under the general rule of interpretation, the ihr must be 
interpreted in “good faith,” according to the “ordinary meaning” given to the 
terms in their context and in light of the “object and purpose” of the ihr.32 
This general rule essentially calls for a textual interpretation of the treaty. The 
added requirements to interpret the terms in “good faith” and taking into ac-
count its object and purpose ward off a purely literal approach to interpreta-
tion, however. Instead, the result of the analysis at this stage is to reflect the 
intentions as expressed in the text.33 Section 3 of this consensus statement 
undertakes this textual interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the ihr’s 
Article 43, while anchoring the analysis in the greater context of the ihr as 
well as the underlying object and purpose of these regulations.
2.2.2 General Rule of Interpretation: Subsequent Agreement and 
Subsequent Practice of the Parties
Relevant as well for the purposes of interpreting the ihr are Articles 31(3)
(a) and 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention’s general rule. Article 31(3)(a) states 
that, alongside the context, there must be taken into account: “[a]ny subse-
quent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions.”34 Article 31(3)(b) further adds to 
this list of interpretive sources “any subsequent practice in the application 
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
31 ihr, above n 4.
32 Vienna Convention, above n 24, art 31(1).
33 Gardiner, above n 25, 172.
34 Vienna Convention, above n 24, art 31(3)(b).
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of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.”35
In its Draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in 
relation to the interpretation of treaties, the ilc commented that the term 
“agreement” under Articles 31(3)(a) and 31(3)(b) is limited to an agreement of 
“all the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty.”36 The defining test, for 
the purpose of identifying state practice, is that the practice establishes the 
agreement of the parties, typically by showing what has been done “systemati-
cally or repeatedly in implementation and application of a treaty.”37
According to the ilc, “the weight of a subsequent agreement or practice as 
a means of interpretation under article 31, paragraph 3, depends, inter alia, on 
its clarity and specificity” and added that the weight of a subsequent practice 
also depends on “whether and how it is repeated.”38 There is, however, a pre-
sumption that the parties do not intend to amend or modify a treaty through 
 subsequent practice.39 Consequently, caution is warranted if a subsequent 
agreement or practice appears to change the meaning of a treaty without fol-
lowing the amendment procedures set out by the treaty.40 Section 4 will review 
how parties have applied (or misapplied) Article 43 of the ihr individually 
and through the who itself – via the wha and who’s Executive Board – with 
a view to determining whether their conduct has given rise to an agreement 
which may be useful for the interpretation of Article 43.
2.2.3 General Rule of Interpretation: Any Relevant Rules of 
International Law
As a third but equally important element, the Vienna Convention calls for 
consideration of “any rules of international law applicable to the relations be-
tween the parties.” The provision is an expression of the principle of systemic 
integration, which recognizes that “treaties are a creation of the international 
legal system and their operation is predicated on that fact.”41 As articulated 
by the International Law Commission’s Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law, Article 31(3)(c) aims to generate coherence with “material 
35 Ibid art 31(3)(b).
36 ilc Study on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice, above note 29, 75.
37 Gardiner, above n 25, 254.
38 ilc Study on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice, above n 29, 70.
39 Ibid 51.
40 Gardiner, above n 25, 226.
41 General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-Eighth Session, UN 
gaor, 61st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc. A/61/10 (1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) 413.
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 sources external to the treaty” but nonetheless relevant in its interpretation, 
including “other treaties, customary rules or general principles of law.”42
According to international legal scholars who have analyzed the preparatory 
work of the ilc on the Vienna Convention, the terms of this clause operation-
ally allow for obligations emerging from other international legal agreements 
which apply to the parties of a treaty under interpretation to be considered 
as part of the “relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations 
between parties.”43 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed this ap-
proach in Djibouti v France (2008), a case in which Djibouti successfully sup-
ported its claim that France had violated its obligations for mutual assistance 
under the 1986 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters by refer-
ring to a 1977 bilateral treaty which required the two countries to found their 
relations on equality, mutual respect and peace.44
A point of continued debate in this element of the general rule is whether 
Article 31(3)(c) requires all parties to the treaty under interpretation to also be 
parties of the treaties providing interpretive guidance.45 Section 5 examines 
the relevant normative environment surrounding the ihr, addressing as well 
this point of continued debate under Article 31(3)(c).
2.2.4 Supplementary means of Interpretation
The Vienna Convention enumerates a non-exhaustive list of supplementary 
means of interpretation under Article 32 “in order to confirm the meaning re-
sulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when 
the interpretation according to Article 31(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”46 
These supplementary means may include the preparatory work of the treaty 
or the circumstances of its conclusion. More recently, the ilc has advised that 
the “other” subsequent practice in the application of a treaty may also be a 
supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of Article 32.47 
Throughout this consensus statement, supplementary means of interpretation 
are used to confirm the meanings deduced through the elements of the gen-
eral rule described in the subsections above.
42 Ibid.
43 Gardiner, above n 25, 301.
44 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) ( Judgment) 
[2008] icj Rep 177, 219.
45 Gardiner, above n 25, 301.
46 Vienna Convention, above n 24, art 32.
47 ilc Study on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice, above n 29, 13.
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3 Ordinary Meaning of Article 43
3.1 Purpose and Context of the ihr as a Whole
The purpose of the revised ihr, as stated in Article 2 of this legal instrument, 
is to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to 
the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and 
restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference 
with international traffic and trade.”48
The ihr must be implemented in accordance with the principles delineat-
ed in Article 3. Using the force of mandatory language, these principles state 
that the ihr shall be implemented “with full respect for the dignity, human 
rights and fundamental freedom of persons,” “guided by the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Constitution of the World Health Organization”, and 
“guided by the goal of their universal application for the protection of all peo-
ple of the world from the international spread of disease.” In recognition of the 
principle of sovereignty, Article 3 further recognizes that “[s]tates have, in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of interna-
tional law, the sovereign right to legislate and to implement legislation in pur-
suance of their health policies. In doing so they should uphold the purpose of 
these Regulations.”49
Since the Vienna Convention’s general rule of interpretation focuses on the 
text of the treaty itself in defining “context”, it is important to reflect upon 
the architecture of the ihr, Article 43’s placement within the regulations, as 
well as related provisions which would help guide an understanding of what 
additional measures states can legally enact in response to public health risks.
The ihr is divided into 10 parts. Part i (Articles 1–4) articulates the defi-
nitions, purpose, scope, principles, and responsible authorities under the 
regulations. Part ii (Articles 5–14) details the procedures of the public health 
 response, including the system of notification to the who of potential pheics. 
Part iii (Articles 15–18) delineates the types of recommendations that may be 
issued by who under the ihr, including the non-binding nature of these rec-
ommendations. Part iv (Articles 19–22) establishes ihr requirements at ports 
of entry. Part v (Articles 23 to 34) outlines the public health measures that 
may be taken in response to public health risks (as well as limits to such mea-
sures). Part vi (Articles 35–39) addresses requirements for health documenta-
tion. Part vii (Articles 40–41) considers the appropriateness of levying charges 
for health measures applied to travelers as well as to baggage, cargo, goods, 
48 ihr, above n 4, art 2.
49 Ibid art 3.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2021 04:04:02PM
via free access
 15Clarifying IHR Article 43 | 10.1163/15723747-2020023
<UN>
international organizations law review (2020) 1-68
and other objects. Part viii (Articles 42 to 46) contains “general provisions” 
with linkage and applicability to other parts of the ihr. The terms of refer-
ence, composition, and mode of operation of the ihr’s Review Committee and 
the Emergency Committee are contained in Part ix (Articles 47 to 53). Part x 
( Articles 54 to 66) contains final provisions, including measures for self-reports 
of ihr implementation, procedures for amending the ihr, and the relation-
ship of the ihr with other intergovernmental agreements. Article 43 is situ-
ated in Part viii alongside clauses invoking transparency, non- discrimination, 
collaboration, and data confidentiality.
Departing from the disease-specific model of the ihr (1969), the revised 
ihr adopts an all-hazards approach to public health protection. As such, a 
“disease” is defined as “an illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or 
source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans.”50 A “public 
health risk” is defined as the “likelihood of an event that may affect adversely 
the health of human populations, with an emphasis on one which may spread 
internationally or may present a serious and direct danger.”51 It follows from 
this definition that any “extraordinary event” may be considered a pheic if it 
(1) constitutes a public health risk to other states through the international 
spread of disease and (2) potentially requires a coordinated international 
response.52
The authority to declare a pheic belongs to who’s director-general,53 who 
must actively consider information provided by affected states, the views of an 
Emergency Committee of international experts nominated under the ihr to 
provide advice,54 scientific principles, as well as the available scientific evi-
dence and other relevant information.55 The determination of a pheic is thus 
an exercise in risk management, requiring an analysis of the risk to human 
health, the international spread of disease, and interference with international 
traffic and trade.56
A decision instrument in the ihr’s Annex 2 guides states in deciding wheth-
er a particular event detected by their national surveillance system may consti-
tute a potential pheic that should be notified to the who.57 States must 
 consider whether: (a) the public health impact of the event is serious; (b) the 
50 Ibid art 1.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid art 12(1).
54 Ibid art 48.
55 Ibid arts 12(4)(a)-(d).
56 Ibid art 12(4)(e).
57 Ibid art 6.
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event is unusual or unexpected; (c) there is potential for the event to spread 
internationally; and/or (d) there is a significant risk that restrictions to travel 
or trade may result because of the event.58 An affirmative answer to any two of 
these questions requires states to notify the event to the who. Additionally, 
Annex 2 contains a list of diseases to which the decision instrument must al-
ways be applied due to their ability to have serious public health impact and 
spread rapidly. States must also notify on the occurrence of a second list of 
diseases whose occurrence is both unusual or unexpected, may have a serious 
public health impact, and therefore constitute a pheic. This same decision 
instrument may be used as a further resource by who’s director-general when 
evaluating whether to declare a pheic.59
In contrast to the former ihr (1969), information received by the who 
under the ihr’s above-mentioned notification scheme is considered confi-
dential and will only be shared with other states if a pheic is confirmed or 
if the public health risk is too great to justify confidentiality.60 The revision 
was intended to encourage states to report events that may lead to the inter-
national spread of disease, without fearing disruptions to travel and trade for 
doing so.61
Embracing an “upstream” public health strategy to prevent and contain out-
breaks at their source, the ihr requires states to develop minimum core public 
health capacities at local, regional and national levels (detailed in the ihr’s 
Annex 1) to detect, assess, and report public health issues to the who.62 As a 
corollary to this obligation, states agree to “collaborate with each other, to the 
extent possible,” to develop and maintain core capacities.63
Finally, the ihr identifies health measures that states must, may, and can-
not legally take when responding to public health risks. According to the ihr, 
a “health measure” involves any procedure “applied to prevent the spread of 
disease or contamination,” to the exclusion of law enforcement or security 
measures.64 Unlike the former ihr (1969), the list of health measures explic-
itly recognized is not intended to be exhaustive.65 Enumerated under Part v 
of the ihr, nearly all of the health measures listed are subject to “applicable 
58 Ibid annex 2.
59 Ibid art 12(4)(b).
60 Ibid art 11(2).
61 Tigerstrom, above n 13, 40.
62 ihr, above n 4, art 5.
63 Ibid art 44(1).
64 Ibid art 1.
65 Tigerstrom, above n 13, 51.
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 international agreements,” “other relevant articles” of the ihr, and/or, more 
particularly, Article 43. In response to a specific public health risk or to a phe-
ic,  Article 43 allows states to implement additional health measures, but only 
if they achieve the same or greater levels of health protection than recom-
mendations issued by the who66 or health measures otherwise prohibited by 
specific articles of the ihr67 and only provided certain conditions are met. 
Reflecting on recent and ongoing pheics, Article 43 has emerged as one of 
the most contentious provisions of the ihr, both in terms of differing views 
among states of its meaning and in terms of states’ compliance with its obli-
gations.68 A more thorough textual, purposive and practical interpretation of 
Article 43’s key obligations is therefore needed. Before beginning this interpre-
tive exercise, however, an explanatory note is warranted on the limits of state 
responsibility under the ihr.
3.2 The Responsibility of ihr States Parties for Private Acts and 
Omissions
The ihr is binding on 196 states parties and governs relevant actions that are 
attributed to them. As a general rule, it does not apply to the decisions of pri-
vate entities, corporations and non-governmental actors. Decisions made by 
these private actors, such as airline flight cancellations or trip itinerary chang-
es by cruise ship operators, may nevertheless impact states parties’ ability to 
comply with the requirements of Article 43.
Where the conduct of a private actor is concerned, the state may nonethe-
less bear responsibility for that conduct in accordance with the principle of 
state responsibility under international law, codified by the ilc in the non-
binding but authoritative Draft articles on responsibility of states for interna-
tionally wrongful acts (draft articles).69
The draft articles stipulate that an act or omission that is attributable to a 
state under international law and which constitutes a breach of an interna-
tional obligation borne by that state engages state responsibility.70 According 
to Article 5, this includes the conduct of a person or entity that is not an  organ 
of the state but is nevertheless “empowered by the law of that state to exercise 
66 Ibid art 43(1)(a).
67 Ibid art 43(1)(b).
68 Ali Tejpar and Steven J Hoffman, ‘Canada’s Violation of International Law during the 
2014–16 Ebola Outbreak’ (2017) 54 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 366.
69 General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commissionn Fifty-Third Session, UN 
gaor, 56th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001) 
(‘Draft articles’).
70 Ibid 26.
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elements of the governmental authority” – provided the person or entity was 
acting in said capacity in the particular instance under issue.71 Such a situation 
may arise, for instance, when private or state-owned airlines are delegated au-
thority in relation to immigration control or quarantine.72 Where the law of 
the state empowers the person or entity to exercise some aspect of governmen-
tal authority, the state may be held responsible, irrespective of whether it gave 
specific instructions or directed the specific conduct derived from such 
authority.73
Relatedly, the conduct of a person or group of persons, acting under the in-
structions, direction or control of the state may be attributed to the state for 
the purposes of determining responsibility under Article 8.74 While merely 
owning or establishing a corporation does not lead to a presumption of re-
sponsibility, a state may be deemed responsible for the conduct of corpora-
tions or private entities that it owns or has established, if that conduct can be 
attributed to the state within the meaning of Article 5, and if that state has in 
fact directed, instructed or controlled a particular conduct or activity of the 
entity in question.75
Situations of total or partial state collapse, or the loss of state authority 
over a locality, are also foreseen by the draft articles. In such circumstances, 
conduct may be attributed to a state where a person or group of persons car-
ries out elements of governmental authority in the absence or default of the 
official authority, and where circumstances called for the exercise of such 
authority.76
Finally, Article 11 of the draft articles allows for conduct to be attributable to 
the state where there is tacit acknowledgment and adoption of the conduct as 
the state’s own. In these situations, responsibility will accrue upon the state 
even where the conduct would normally be considered “purely private” under 
any other circumstances.77
For the remainder of this consensus statement, interpretations of Article 43 
refer only to those health measures which are decided upon and implemented 
by the state and/or health measures which can be attributed to the state per 
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3.3 Textual Interpretation of ihr Article 43
3.3.1 Article 43(1): Typology of Additional Health Measures
While no standalone definition of “additional health measure” is provided un-
der the ihr, paragraph 1 of Article 43 qualifies an additional health measure in 
one of two ways: either (1) it achieves the same or greater levels of protection 
than the who recommendations (including temporary recommendations);78 
or (2) it is applied despite being otherwise prohibited by the following 
provisions:
– Article 25, which prohibits the application of health measures to ships and 
aircraft in transit and not coming from an affected area;79
– Article 26, which prohibits the application of health measures to civilian 
lorries, trains and coaches in transit and not coming from an affected area;80
– Article 28 paragraph 1 or 2, which prohibit the denial of free pratique [per-
mission for a ship, aircraft or ground transport vehicle to embark or disem-
bark, discharge or load cargo or stores] to ships and aircraft or their calling 
at any point of entry, except under certain conditions;81
– Article 30, which requires giving permission to travellers under public 
health observation to continue on an international voyage if the traveler 
does not pose an imminent public health risk;82
– Article 31 paragraph 1(c), which prohibits the requirement for invasive med-
ical examination, vaccination or other prophylaxis as a condition of entry 
except pursuant to Article 43 or annexes 6 and 7;83 and
– Article 33, which prohibits the application of health measures to goods, 
other than live animals, in transit without transhipment.84
For efficiency, the above list of otherwise prohibited health measures will here-
after be referred to as “listed” additional health measures, while the measures 
foreseen by paragraph 1(a) will be referred to as “non-listed” additional health 
measures. Article 43 restricts the permissibility of both listed and non-listed 
additional health measures through a set of prima facie conditions under para-
graph 1 and scientific decision-making criteria under  paragraph 2. These serve 
as the focus of analysis in the below sections because they serve as the primary 
limitations on what additional measures states may implement in response to 
public health risks.
78 ihr, above n 4, art 43(1)(a).
79 Ibid art 25.
80 Ibid art 26.
81 Ibid arts 28(1) and 28(2).
82 Ibid art 30.
83 Ibid art 31(1)(c).
84 Ibid art 33.
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3.3.2  Article 43(1): Preliminary conditions underpinning the 
permissibility of additional health measures
Four overarching conditions serve as prerequisites to the use of additional 
health measures. As a first condition, additional measures must be in accor-
dance with “the relevant national law” of the state and their “obligations under 
international law.”85 Elsewhere in the ihr, reference is also made to the ihr’s 
relationship with other international agreements; it is provided that the provi-
sions of the ihr should be interpreted so as to be compatible with other inter-
national agreements, and that such provisions “shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of any State Party deriving from other international agreements.”86 
Such agreements include “special treaties”87 and the “common rules in force” 
within a regional economic integration organization.88 The constraints and al-
lowances placed on additional health measures outlined in paragraph 1 must 
be informed by other relevant international legal obligations, which form the 
subject of our analysis in Section 5.
Secondly, these measures must be taken in response to a specific public 
health risk (as defined earlier) or to a pheic. Furthermore, these measures 
must be “otherwise consistent” with the ihr.89 This statement reinforces the 
importance of ensuring that Article 43 aligns with the numerous provisions of 
the ihr which enshrine obligations toward human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of persons and travelers. These provisions, and the broader human 
rights framework, are examined in greater detail in Section 5.
Referring to additional health measures as defined above, paragraph 1 of 
Article 43 closes with the final condition that such measures “shall not be more 
restrictive of international traffic and not more invasive or intrusive to persons 
than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level 
of health protection.”90 Article 1 defines “intrusive” as “possibly provoking dis-
comfort through close or intimate contact or questioning” while “invasive” is 
defined as “the puncture or incision of the skin or insertion of an instrument 
or foreign material into the body or the examination of a body cavity.” “Interna-
tional traffic” is also broadly conceptualized as “the movement of persons, bag-
gage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods or postal parcels across an interna-
tional border, including international trade.”91 Taken  together, this clause 
85 Ibid art 43(1).
86 Ibid art 57(1).
87 Ibid art 57(2).
88 Ibid art 57(3).
89 Ibid art 43(1).
90 Ibid art 43(1).
91 Ibid art 1.
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serves as a reminder to states that the principle of proportionality is embedded 
within the ihr, including a requirement that their additional health measures 
must be “commensurate with and restricted to public health risks.”92
3.3.3 Article 43(2): Assessing the Appropriateness of an Additional 
Health Measure
Paragraph 2 of Article 43 delineates how states are to assess the appropriate-
ness of an additional health measure in light of the risks to human health, and 
in so doing, it further limits the range of additional health measures that may 
be considered appropriate. These limits apply to the decision framework states 
must use to implement any additional health measures described in paragraph 
1. They also apply to the implementation of certain health measures expressly 
permitted elsewhere in the ihr, and specifically under the following 
provisions:
– Article 23(2), which allows, on a case-by-case basis and on the basis of evi-
dence of a public health risk, for the application of the “least intrusive and 
invasive medical examination” on a suspected or affected traveler that 
would achieve the public health objective of preventing the international 
spread of disease;93
– Article 27(1), which allows for the implementation of additional health 
measures, including the isolation of conveyances by a competent authority, 
where there is evidence of a public health risk on board a conveyance;94
– Article 28(2), which allows states to subject the granting of free pratique of 
ships and aircrafts to inspection, and if infection or contamination is found, 
to carry out the necessary measures to prevent the spread of the infection or 
contamination;95 and
– Article 31(2)(c), which states that, in the absence of consent from a traveler 
for whom the state requires a medical examination, vaccination or other 
prophylaxis, where there is evidence of imminent public health risk, and to 
the extent necessary to control such a risk, the state may “compel the travel-
ler to undergo or advise the traveller…to undergo…additional established 
health measures that prevent or control the spread of disease, including iso-
lation, quarantine or placing the traveller under public health observation.”96
92 Ibid art 2.
93 Ibid art 23(2).
94 Ibid art 27(1).
95 Ibid art 28(2).
96 Ibid art 31(2)(c).
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Any decision on the implementation of an additional health measure cap-
tured in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 43 must be based on “(a) scientific 
principles;97 (b) available scientific evidence of a risk to human health, or 
where such evidence is insufficient, the available information from who or 
other relevant intergovernmental organizations and international bodies;98 
and (c) any available specific guidance or advice from who.”99
The use of the prescriptive “shall” in paragraph 2 (as opposed to “should” or 
“may”) indicates that the exercise of determining whether an additional health 
measure should be implemented is a mandatory requirement for states. This is 
in keeping with the object and purpose of the ihr to “provide a public health 
response to the international spread of disease while avoiding unnecessary in-
terference with international traffic and trade [emphasis added]”.
The verb “base” is also significant; when compared to other ihr provisions 
containing verbs with related meaning (such as “conform”100), its use suggests 
that states have some margin of appreciation in how they render their determi-
nation of an additional health measure. The use of “and” rather than “or” in 
paragraph 2 signals that the sources of information listed in paragraphs 2(a) to 
2(c) must be cumulatively present when states are determining whether to ap-
ply additional health measures. The meanings of these specific terms are more 
closely examined below.
“Scientific Principles” (Art. 43(2)(a)) and “Available Scientific Evidence” 
(Art. 43(2)(b))
Beyond Article 1 and Article 43, “scientific principles” and “scientific evidence” 
appear three times in the ihr, always making their appearance together: un-
der Article 12, the who director-general must consider “scientific  principles as 
well as the available scientific evidence and other relevant information” prior 
to declaring a pheic;101 under Article 17, the director-general must consider 
“scientific principles as well as available scientific evidence” prior to issuing, 
modifying or terminating recommendations.102
It is reasonable to conclude that efforts made to avoid qualifying “scientific 
principles” with the adjective “available” were deliberate across the ihr. Scien-
tific principles, as defined in the ihr, are “the accepted fundamental laws and 
97 Ibid art 43(2)(a).
98 Ibid art 43(2)(b).
99 Ibid art 43(2)(c).
100 Ibid arts 36(1), 36(2), 37, 38, 39.
101 Ibid art 12(4)(d).
102 Ibid art 17(c).
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facts of nature known through the methods of science [emphasis added].”103 
On the other hand, scientific evidence is described in the IHR as “information 
furnishing a level of proof based on the established and accepted methods of 
science [emphasis added].”104
While the ihr provides no further definition or guidance regarding the 
sources and standard of evidence that parties should consider when deciding 
to implement additional health measures, such evidence must be generated by 
the “methods of science”. The Oxford Dictionary of Public Health describes the 
“scientific method” as typically involving steps to:
…define the problem; if possible, frame the problem as a hypothesis; 
select in advance a valid and proven method and specify procedures to 
study the problem; conduct all observations according to a stated proto-
col that is or will be available for examination by peers; include all obser-
vations in the stated results; and, if any observations or measurements 
are discarded or disqualified, the reason must be stated and explained.105
On this basis, and given that the purpose of the ihr is to “provide a public 
health response to the international spread of disease”, it is clear that states 
should implement only those measures that can withstand scientific scrutiny 
in the discipline of public health. In other words, beyond merely accessing re-
sults published in scientific journals,  deliberate care must be exercised to ap-
praise the quality of the evidence supporting the use of an additional health 
measure and to rely upon scientific findings that are sound in methodology, 
ethics and integrity. While states have a margin of appreciation in deciding 
whether or not to implement additional health measures, these decisions are 
subject to overriding public health considerations imposed by the purpose of 
ihr.
Often, there may be a degree of scientific uncertainty involved at the outset 
of a public health risk. This uncertainty may be related to the disease’s trans-
mission methods, incubation period, and fatality rate, and evidence supporting 
appropriate health measures may not be available.106 In such cases,  additional 
health measures must be supported by scientific principles. Paragraph 2(b) 
clarifies that absent sufficient scientific evidence, reference may  alternatively 
103 Ibid art 1.
104 Ibid.
105 Miquel Porta and John M Last (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of Public Health (2nd ed, 2018) 
sub verbo “scientific method”.
106 Jonathan E Suk, ‘Sound Science and the New International Health Regulations’ (2007) 1(2) 
Global Health Governance 1, 2.
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be made to the “available information from who or other relevant intergov-
ernmental organizations and international bodies.” The text remains vague 
about the minimum level of scientific evidence and/or information that might 
be deemed as “sufficient” for the purposes of the assessment exercise under 
paragraph 2. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in our analysis of the relevant 
rules of international law in Section 5, at minimum, there should be a rational 
and proportional connection between the legitimate aim that the additional 
health measure is seeking to address and the scientific evidence underpinning 
the decision to implement the health measure. Such scientific evidence need 
not be the monolithic view or opinion of all scientists but must withstand sci-
entific scrutiny in the discipline of public health.
“Information from who or Other Relevant Intergovernmental 
 Organizations and International Bodies” (Art. 43(2)(b))
A further criterion which may support the assessment of whether additional 
health measures are permissible is information from who or other ‘relevant’ 
intergovernmental organizations and international bodies. Which other orga-
nizations and bodies are ‘relevant’? It is worth noting the qualifying term 
“ relevant” used in the English text of Article 43 paragraph 2(b). The term “com-
petent” (‘competent’) is used in place of the equivalent word for ‘relevant’ in 
the French text. Article 66 of the ihr confirms that the English and French 
texts, along with four other languages, are equally authoritative107 – which 
aligns with the Vienna Convention’s approach as well.108 Where there is a differ-
ence in meaning between two texts, the Vienna Convention reminds us to use 
the meaning “which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and 
purpose of the treaty.”109
The difference in choice of words may be significant. According to the Ox-
ford Dictionary of English, the word ‘relevant’ refers to being “closely connect-
ed or appropriate to what is being done or considered”, while ‘competent’ re-
fers to “having the necessary ability, knowledge, or skill to do something 
successfully.”110 However, the term ‘compétent’ in French also refers to having 
jurisdiction over something (for example, French lawyers refer to “competence 
de la competence” to indicate when an organ has the authority to define the 
scope of its own mandate). As a result of this discrepancy, the French text 
107 ihr, above n 4, art 66(1).
108 Vienna Convention, above n 24, art 33(1).
109 Ibid art 33(4).
110 Oxford Dictionary of English (oup, 3rd ed, 2010) sub verbo “relevant”; Oxford Dictionary of 
English (oup, 3rd ed, 2010) sub verbo “competent”.
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 suggests that the international organizations or bodies which may provide in-
formation supporting the implementation of an additional health measure are 
limited to those organizations and bodies having the mandate and possessing 
the ability (such as the scientific expertise and technical resources) to issue 
such information.
Given equal authority, the term ‘competent’ should be favoured over ‘rele-
vant’ for two reasons: (1) it is logical in light of the ihr’s purpose to expect that 
an international organization or body that is issuing information on responses 
to public health risks be competent to do so; and (2) the term ‘competence’ is 
invoked elsewhere in the English version to describe external bodies with 
whom who is expected to work.111 It is also used in wha resolution 58.3 (an 
agreement made by all parties in connection with the conclusion of the ihr) 
which provides a non-exhaustive list of organizations which may qualify as 
“competent intergovernmental organizations or international bodies with 
which who is expected to cooperate and coordinate its activities.” These in-
clude the United Nations, International Labour Organization, Food & Agricul-
ture Organization (fao), International Atomic Energy Agency, International 
Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross & 
Red Crescent Societies, International Air Transport Association, International 
Shipping Federation, and Office International des Epizooties (oie).112
Therefore, unless there is sufficient scientific evidence available or support-
ing information from competent intergovernmental organizations or interna-
tional bodies, additional health measures would not be permissible under 
 Article 43(2).
“Any Available Specific Guidance or Advice from who” (Art. 43(2)(c))
The implementation of an additional health measure must also be informed 
by guidance or advice from who where available and where such guidance 
or advice is specific – presumably, to the public health risk at hand. The use 
of the word “specific” in Article 43(2)(c) contrasts with the previous phrase 
examined.
For states to rely on who guidance or advice for implementing additional 
health measures, who will have had to issue a positive recommendation, rath-
er than merely abstain from issuing a recommendation against the additional 
health measure. Given the context of the ihr, guidance should be (1) an offi-
cial statement (i.e., from the wha, Executive Board, or the Secretariat) that 
111 ihr, above n 4, art 14(1).
112 ihr, above n 4.
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(2) stemmed from a formal and scientific process and (3) is expressed norma-
tively. Examples of such guidance include who’s sars travel advisories, advice 
on personal protective equipment for Ebola, and statements on safe burial 
practices during infectious disease outbreaks.113 While “specific guidance or 
advice” need not be focused on the ihr – and can be construed more broadly – 
it must be specific to the public health risk at hand.
The guidance or advice from who that most clearly meets the ihr Article 
43(2)(c)’s specificity requirement would be those formal recommendations 
that can be issued by the director-general under Articles 15 to 18 of the ihr. 
Under these provisions, who’s director-general may issue recommendations 
after considering: affected states’ views; the Emergency Committee’s advice, 
scientific principles and available evidence; appropriate health measures that 
are not more restrictive of international traffic and trade than reasonably avail-
able alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protec-
tion; relevant international standards and instruments; activities undertaken 
by other intergovernmental organizations; and any other available relevant 
information.114
Where a pheic has been declared, who’s director-general will issue tempo-
rary recommendations to affected states or other states that are “non- binding…
time-limited [and] risk-specific” and which may be modified or extended as 
appropriate, including after the pheic has ended.115 who may also issue 
standing recommendations of appropriate health measures, for routine or pe-
riodic application, in response to a specific public health risk.116
Temporary recommendations issued by the who director-general may in-
clude health measures regarding “persons, baggage, cargo, containers, convey-
ances, goods and/or postal parcels”117 and may be informed by, among other 
sources, the views of the affected states, the advice of the Emergency Commit-
tee, scientific principles as well as available scientific evidence and informa-
tion, relevant international standards and instruments, and other appropriate 
and specific information related to the event.118 Temporary recommenda-
tions expire automatically three months after their issuance, after which they 
can be modified or extended for additional periods of up to three months.119 
113 François Lamontagne et al, ‘Evidence-Based Guidelines for Supportive Care of Patients 
with Ebola Virus Disease’ (2017) 391 The Lancet 700.
114 ihr, above n 4, art 17.
115 Ibid, art 1 and 15(1).
116 Ibid art 53.
117 Ibid art 15(2).
118 Ibid art 17.
119 Ibid art 15(3).
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Under ihr Article 13, states may also reach out to the who to request guid-
ance or advice concerning appropriate responses to public health risks120 or 
pheics.121
3.3.4 Article 43(3) to 43(5): Obligation to Report Additional Health 
Measures that Interfere Significantly with International Traffic
According to paragraph 3 of Article 43, where a state has implemented an ad-
ditional health measure that significantly interferes with international traffic, 
it must provide the who with its public health rationale and relevant scientific 
information for it, which will then be shared with other states.122 The state’s 
public health rationale must be provided within 48 hours of implementing ad-
ditional measures.123
‘Significant interference’ with international traffic and trade is generally de-
fined by the ihr as “refusal of entry or departure of international travelers, 
baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods, and the like, or their delay, for 
more than 24 hours.”124 States that implement measures having such effect are 
required to review these within three months, in light of the evidentiary crite-
ria outlined in paragraph 2.125 The foregoing does not preclude the possibility 
of there being circumstances where significant interference may not be de-
fined in temporal terms. For instance, even where a health measure delays 
goods or travelers for less than 24 hours, it may be so widely applied or be of 
such a nature that it has acute effects on some populations. Such a measure 
may still “significantly interfere” with international traffic even if it does not 
impede travel for more than 24 hours.
Furthermore, any state affected by an additional health measure may re-
quest that the state implementing such a measure consult with it in order to 
clarify the scientific information and public health rationale supporting the 
decision, and to find a mutually acceptable solution.126
Article 43 is vague on what may constitute a public health rationale, though 
the most reasonable interpretation may be that a public health rationale is 
formulated from the criteria outlined in paragraph 2, namely: (1) scientific 
principles; (2) available scientific evidence of a risk to human health; and (3) 
any available specific guidance or advice from the who. The fact, as explained 
120 Ibid art 13(3).
121 Ibid art 13(6).
122 Ibid art 43(3).
123 Ibid art 43(5).
124 Ibid art 43(3).
125 Ibid art 43(6).
126 Ibid art 43(7).
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in the following section, that states must review additional health measures 
implemented within three months, taking into account the advice of who, 
scientific principles and available scientific evidence or available information 
from intergovernmental organizations and international bodies,127 lends sup-
port to this interpretation that a public health rationale would stem from the 
logic established under paragraph 2.
A second possible interpretation is that a state’s public health rationale for 
implementing additional health measures could include any factual state-
ment, whether or not it is formulated in terms of the above criteria. This inter-
pretation may be supported by the specific choice of the term “rationale” as 
revealed through the ihr’s negotiating history. Indeed, during negotiations, a 
predecessor to Article 43 (Article 39 of the September 2004 igwg draft), re-
quired states to provide who with “scientific justifications” upon request.128 In 
the January 2005 draft, this clause was changed to require states to provide, 
upon who’s request, a “public health rationale and relevant scientific informa-
tion for it”;129 the revised text also included the option for a state impacted by 
an additional health measure to clarify the public health rationale and scien-
tific information with the state imposing the health measure. The underlying 
intention leading to the shift from “justification” to “rationale” may have been 
to weaken the burden of proof. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “justifi-
cation” as “the action of showing something to be right or reasonable.”130 By 
contrast, “rationale” is defined as “a set of reasons or a logical basis for a course 
of action or belief.”131 The former seeks acceptance, the latter explains and 
clarifies. That being said, this second broader interpretation of what could 
constitute a “rationale” would likely frustrate the underlying purpose and ob-
jective of requiring states to explain their rationale in the first place, and other 
overarching public health goals of the ihr.
In terms of its application, the clause was further modified in the adopted 
text to require the provision of public health rationale and scientific informa-
tion only where the additional health measure interferes “significantly” with 
127 ihr, above n 4, arts 43(2), 43(6).
128 who, Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the International Health 
Regulations, Review and approval of proposed amendments to the International Health 
Regulations: draft revision, Doc No A/ihr/igwg/3 30 September 2004, art 39(2) (‘igwg 
September Working Draft’).
129 who, Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the International Health 
Regulations, Review and approval of proposed amendments to the International Health 
Regulations (Proposal by the Chair), Doc No A/ihr/igwg/2/2, 2nd sess, 24 January 2005, 
art 39(2) (‘igwg Proposal by Chair’).
130 Oxford Dictionary of English (oup, 3rd ed, 2010) sub verbo “justification”.
131 Ibid, sub verbo “rationale”.
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international traffic; In so doing, the clause created an automatic and relatively 
clear threshold beyond which states would be required to provide a public 
health rationale and relevant scientific information for having implemented 
an additional health measure.
3.3.5 Article 43(6) to 43(8): Obligation to Review Additional Health 
Measures Taken Pursuant to Article 43
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 43 create an obligation to review any additional 
health measure taken pursuant to paragraph 1 and 2, regardless of whether the 
additional health measure significantly interferes with international traffic or 
not. This section of Article 43 serves as a reminder that any additional health 
measures must be time-limited and tied to a “public health rationale and rele-
vant scientific information.”
Paragraph 6 requires that parties carry out a review, within three months, of 
any additional health measures they have taken. This timeline is analogous to 
the lifecycle of a temporary recommendation issued by who’s director- general, 
which automatically expires three months after its date of issuance.132 States’ 
review of their additional health measures must be informed by both the “ad-
vice” of who and the criteria set out in paragraph 2, namely: (1) scientific prin-
ciples; (2) available scientific evidence; and (3) any available specific guidance 
or advice from who. It is unclear, based on a textual interpretation, whether 
the “advice of the who” in paragraph 6 differs from “any available specific 
guidance or advice from the who” already listed within the criteria of para-
graph 2. The most likely meaning of this double reference to who’s advice is 
that the reference in paragraph 6 may refer to both direct advice provided by 
who to the implementing state and more general advice provided by who to 
all states, in accordance with the criteria outlined in Art 43(2)(c).
Paragraph 7 of Article 43 allows for the possibility of consultation between 
a state impacted by an additional health measure and the state that has imple-
mented the additional health measure. The consultation process is without 
prejudice to the impacted state’s rights under Article 56, which envisions a se-
ries of dispute resolution mechanisms, beginning with peaceful means such 
as “good offices, mediation or conciliation,”133 then allowing for states to in-
vite the who director-general to make an effort to settle the dispute, followed 
by the parties’ voluntary submission to compulsory arbitration. At any time, 
states may also refer their dispute settlement to the mechanisms of other in-
tergovernmental organizations or those foreseen by any other international 
132 ihr, above n 4, art 15(3).
133 Ibid art 56(1).
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 agreement such as the Statute of the International Court of Justice. According to 
publicly available records, none of these dispute settlement mechanisms has 
ever been used by states affected by additional health measures, and no adju-
dicative body has yet had the opportunity to interpret Article 43.
3.4 Conclusion on Ordinary Meaning of Article 43
Overall, in response to specific public health risks or pheics, Article 43  permits 
states to seek an appropriate level of health protection through the implemen-
tation of additional health measures subject to several preconditions, includ-
ing the use of measures that are no more intrusive or invasive to persons, and 
no more restrictive of international traffic, than reasonably available alterna-
tives, and a scientific assessment of the proposed measure that must be insofar 
as possible, evidence-based. Once the decision is made to implement an ad-
ditional health measure, states trigger two distinct obligations: (1) the obliga-
tion to review any additional health measure imposed within three months in 
light of scientific evidence and the advice of who; and (2) the obligation to 
report to who within 48 hours when an additional health measure is expected 
to interfere significantly with international traffic and trade. Actions taken by 
private and nonstate actors, such as airlines, cruise ship operators, and insur-
gent groups, do not fall under the purview of Article 43 unless they meet the 
criteria outlined under the draft articles. The ordinary meaning of Article 43 is 
illustrated across Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3.
What remains less clear from an ordinary-meaning analysis – and where 
other general and supplementary means of interpretation will be needed – is 
further clarity on the level of scientific evidence required to justify additional 
health measures under Article 43(2)(b). Article 43 also lacks direct guidance 
on what constitutes a valid “public health rationale and relevant scientific in-
formation” under paragraph 3. It is argued that, in order to fulfill the purpose of 
the ihr to facilitate public health responses “that are commensurate with and 
 restricted to public health risks,”134 additional health measures must be sup-
ported by a public health rationale that is, at minimum, based on the scientific 
evidence appraised in paragraph 2. This interpretation is supported by a closer 
examination of subsequent state practice, which is discussed in the next 
section.
Based purely on an ordinary-meaning analysis, it also remains unclear how 
states should operationalize the requirement for additional health measures to 
be no more restrictive of international traffic and no more invasive or  intrusive 
134 ihr, above n 4, art 2.
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Figure 1 State Actions Permissible Under Articles 43(1) and 43(2) of the International Health Regula-
tions in Response to a Specific Public Health Risk or a Public Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern
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to persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the 
 appropriate level of health protection, nor what such an ‘appropriate’ level of 
health protection might be. These questions will be addressed in the sections 
that follow.
Figure 2 State Obligation to Report Additional Health Measures Interfering Significantly 
with International Traffic under Articles 43(3) and 43(5) of the International 
Health Regulations
Figure 3 State Obligation to Review Additional Health Measures Implemented Under 
Article 43(6) of the International Health Regulations
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4 Subsequent Practice and Subsequent Agreement in the Application 
of Article 43
According to the Vienna Convention, in addition to the ordinary meaning and 
context, the interpretation of an international legal instrument should involve 
an analysis of conduct “which establishes the agreement of the parties regard-
ing its interpretation.”135
The weight of subsequent state practice depends inter alia on its clarity and 
specificity, and, furthermore, on “whether and how it is repeated.”136 In other 
words, it should consist of “action of such frequency and uniformity that it war-
rants a conclusion that the parties have reached a settled agreement  regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty.”137 Statements or conduct of other actors, in-
cluding those of international organizations, can also “reflect, or initiate, rel-
evant subsequent practice” of the parties.138 Subsequent agreements which 
do not reflect the volition of all parties (such as resolutions adopted by con-
sensus via an international organization) may nevertheless serve as a supple-
mentary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.139 
The interpretive contribution of subsequent state practice as a supplementary 
means of interpretation, per the ilc, includes providing clarity on meanings 
derived from a textual interpretation of the instrument, or lending meaning to 
gaps or ambiguities within the text.140 Considering the above, the next two sec-
tions examine how parties to the ihr have implemented Article 43 in practice 
through (1) their individual actions and (2) by means of decisions and resolu-
tions adopted by consensus at the wha and who’s Executive Board.
For reasons of data availability, this analysis is primarily situated in the 
context of two major pheics that generated in-depth study by the who: the 
2009 influenza A(H1N1) outbreak and the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa.141 At the time of writing, neither the who secretariat, nor other in-
tergovernmental organizations, systematically published the details of addi-
tional health measures adopted by states. This consideration applies in par-
ticular to the widespread and extreme national measures adopted in response 
to the covid-19 pandemic, still ongoing at the time of finalizing the present 
135 Vienna Convention, above n 24, art 31(3)(a), 31(3)(b).





141 Steven J Hoffman and Sarah L Silverberg, ‘Delays in Global Disease Outbreak Responses: 
Lessons from H1N1, Ebola, and Zika’ (2018) 108(3) American Journal of Public Health 329.
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 contribution. While a WHO tool to identify outbreak-related health measures 
was under development in the recent past,142 it remains inaccessible to the 
public. In the meantime, the best available source of subsequent state practice 
in applying Article 43 comes from media reports, empirical studies, and who’s 
Weekly Epidemiological Record, many of which were produced in reaction to 
the H1N1 and Ebola outbreaks.
4.1 Subsequent Practice of States
Global cooperation and consensus in the application of health measures com-
mensurate with public health risks has historically been difficult to achieve. 
Feared losses in trade, tourism, and reputation disincentivized national gov-
ernments from reporting disease surveillance information to who under the 
ihr (1969). These fears appear to be well-founded. The 1991 cholera outbreak 
in Peru, for instance, resulted in an estimated loss of usd 700 million due to 
far-reaching trade restrictions imposed on Peruvian imports.143 Similarly, de-
spite advice from who that no travel or trade restrictions were warranted, the 
international community met the 1994 plague outbreak in a defined region of 
Surat, India with a range of unilateral health measures, including the cancella-
tion of flights, border closures, and, in some cases, restrictions on Indians liv-
ing abroad.144 Economic losses India incurred as a result of reporting the 
plague outbreak have been estimated at nearly usd 2 billion.145 China simi-
larly delayed disclosing information about the sars outbreak in 2003 to avoid 
facing similar economic blows, and is reported to have delayed once again the 
timely notification of covid-19 outbreaks in the city of Wuhan, Hubei prov-
ince in late 2019.146
The impetus for revising the ihr (1969) in 1995 arose in part from experi-
ences such as the 1991 Peruvian cholera outbreak and the 1994 Indian plague 
outbreak, which underscored the need for significant improvement in state 
compliance with limitations on additional health measures to mitigate the 
142 Adam Kamradt-Scott et al, ‘who Tracking Mechanism for ihr Additional Health Mea-
sures’ (2018) 392 The Lancet 2250.
143 David P Fidler, ‘Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and Inter-
national Law’ (1997) 81(4) Minnesota Law Review 771, 815–816.
144 Richard A Cash and Vasant Narasimhan, ‘Impediments To Global Surveillance Of Infec-
tious Diseases: Consequences of Open Reporting In A Global Economy’ (2000) 78(11) Bul-
letin of the World Health Organization 1358, 1361.
145 Ibid 1362.
146 Tsai-Yu Lin, ‘The Forgotten Role of who/ihr in Trade Responses to 2009 A/H1N1 Influ-
enza Outbreak’ (2010) 44(3) Journal of World Trade 515, 519; Gostin and Katz, above n 3, 
267; Matthew M Kavanagh, ‘Authoritarianism, Outbreaks, and Information Politics’ 
(2020) 5(3) The Lancet Public Health e135 <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/
article/PIIS2468-2667(20)30030-X/abstract>.
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economic consequences of public health risks.147 The sars outbreak acceler-
ated the pace and intensity of negotiations during the final two years before 
agreement on the final text of the revised ihr, with an Intergovernmental 
Working Group (igwg) holding meetings in November 2004 and February 
2005 to draft and address revisions released in January 2004,148 September 
2004,149 and January 2005.150 The degree to which states would have the flexi-
bility to implement additional health measures beyond those recommended 
by the who director-general or prescribed by the ihr was a point of conten-
tion throughout the revision process.151
As the first pheic declared under the ihr, H1N1 provided the earliest op-
portunity for an in-depth review of the ihr’s functioning, including how states 
applied Article 43. The latter topic was the subject of a who survey, published 
in the Weekly Epidemiological Record, evaluating the public health measures 
taken at international borders during the first three months (20 April 2009, 
to 31 July 2009) of the outbreak.152 The report surveyed public health authori-
ties, as well as representatives from the airline industry, maritime industry 
and airports. Of the 144 responses received, 56 were from state public health 
authorities.
One temporary recommendation, which remained unchanged from the 
date of its issuance by who’s director-general on 27 April 2009 until the end of 
the pheic, was “not to close borders and not to restrict international travel.”153 
Nevertheless, nearly half of states responding to the survey (i.e., 26 of 56 states) 
reported advising their citizens to avoid travelling to affected states during the 
147 Asha Herten-Crabb and Suerie Moon, ‘Outbreak-Related Travel Restrictions: Health & 
Economic Consequences’ (Geneva and London: Global Health Centre, the Graduate In-
stitute of International and Development Studies and Centre on Global Health Security, 
Chatham House, 2017) <https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/295277/files/
Briefing_Note_Outbreak-Related_Travel_Restrictions_FINAL.pdf>.
148 who, Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revisions of the International Health 
Regulations, International Health Regulations (Working Paper for regional consultations), 
Doc No igwg/ihr/Working paper/12.2003, 12 January 2004.
149 igwg September Working Draft, above n 128.
150 igwg Proposal by Chair, above n 129.
151 See eg who, Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revisions of the International 
Health Regulations, Review and approval of proposed amendments to the International 
Health Regulations: explanatory notes, Doc No A/ihr/igwg/4, 7 October 2004 [13]; igwg 
Proposal by Chair, above n 129, art 39 ; Tigerstrom, above n 13, 48.
152 who, Public Health Measures Taken at International Borders During Early Stages of Pan-
demic Influenza A (H1N1) 2009: Preliminary Results, (2010) 85(21) Weekly Epidemiological 
Report Record 186.
153 who, World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005): Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health 
 Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (Report by the Director General), 
64th assembly, Doc No A64/10, 5 May 2011, 80 (‘H1N1 Review Committee Report’).
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early stages of the H1N1 outbreak, while two states reported denying entry to 
travelers from affected states. Thirty-four of 56 (61%) states reported screening 
incoming passengers, usually combined with some form of isolation of con-
firmed cases. Ten states that isolated confirmed cases also quarantined asymp-
tomatic close contacts of cases for 3–10 days.
In terms of trade restrictions, the who survey found that 6 of the 56 re-
sponding states reported restricting the entry of animals or goods from affected 
states.154 However, media reports indicate that up to 20 countries  adopted bans 
on American, Canadian and Mexican pigs and pork imports.155 These bans oc-
curred despite a joint statement from who, fao, oie and World Trade Orga-
nization (wto) stating that pork products could not transmit the disease.156
As the official Review Committee on the Role of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) (‘Ebola Review Committee’) reported, several states repeat-
ed the use of additional health measures during the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak. 
Despite the who director-general’s ongoing recommendation against any ban 
on international travel or trade from March 2014 and April 2015, there were re-
ports of 570 additional health measures implemented by 69 countries. More 
than 470 of these measures were deemed by who’s secretariat to have not in-
terfered with international traffic. Of the remaining 100 measures, 41 were 
found to have interfered significantly with international traffic. These mea-
sures included the compulsory quarantine of travelers, refusal of entry visas, 
cancellation of flights, and closure of air, land and sea borders.157 By December 
2015, the Emergency Committee noted that 34 countries continued to enact 
“inappropriate travel and transport measures.”158
A second study, conducted by a group of independent researchers between 
March 2015 and April 2015, found that at least 58 states had enacted travel 
 restrictions to or from Ebola-affected countries in West Africa.159 States like An-
tigua and Barbuda, Australia, and Jamaica banned all travel from  Ebola- affected 
154 Ibid.
155 Laura MacInnis, ‘Flu fears prompt new bans on pork, meat imports’ Reuters (Website, 4th May 
2009) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-flu-who-trade/flu-fears-prompt-new-bans 
-on-pork-meat-imports-idUSTRE5434NP20090504>.
156 Jennifer B Nuzzo et al, ‘Travel Bans Will Increase the Damage Wrought by Ebola’ (2014) 
12(6) Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 306, 307.
157 Ebola Review Committee Report, above n 19, [70–72].
158 who, Statement on the 8th meeting of the ihr Emergency Committee regarding the 2014 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa (18 December 2015) <https://www.who.int/mediacentre/
news/statements/2015/ihr-ebola-8th-meeting/en/>.
159 Wendy Rhymer and Rick Speare, ‘Countries’ Response to who’s Travel Recommen-
dations during the 2013–16 Ebola Outbreak’ (2017) 95(1) Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization 10.
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states, while others like Afghanistan and Indonesia  implemented strict visa en-
try requirements.160 Ebola was estimated to have cost the three most-affected 
states economic losses totaling usd 2.8 billion.161
Both the H1N1 Review Committee and the Ebola Review Committee also 
expressed concern that states rarely reported additional health measures that 
significantly interfered with international travel or trade and that they rarely 
provided the public health rationale and relevant scientific information for 
these measures. The H1N1 Review Committee noted that no state that imple-
mented additional health measures complied with its obligation to proactively 
inform who and provide the rationale for additional health measures imple-
mented and few provided rationales even when requested by who to do so.162 
Similarly, the Ebola Review Committee pointed out that only 40% of states 
responded to who requests for verification of the public health rationale and 
relevant scientific information supporting the use of excessive additional 
health measures.163 In the early days of the 2020 covid-19 pandemic, more 
than two thirds of states that had implemented additional health measures 
were again reported to have neglected their obligation to inform the who of 
such measures.164
While much attention is often paid to those states that implement additional 
health measures grossly exceeding appropriate limits, and even as these states 
fail to report such additional health measures to who, it appears that most 
states remain in compliance with the ihr most of the time and follow recom-
mendations issued by who’s director-general.165 Additional health measures 
adopted during the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak were vigorously denounced by 
other states through resolutions adopted at the UN Security Council,166 and 
the Assembly of the African Union,167 among other  international fora. More 
160 Tejpar and Hoffman, above n 68, 377.
161 World Bank Group, 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola Crisis: Impact Update (Geneva: World 
Bank Group, 2016).
162 H1N1 Review Committee Report, above n 153, 80.
163 Ebola Review Committee Report, above n 19, [72].
164 Roojin Habibi et al, ‘Do not violate the International Health Regulations during the 
covid-19 outbreak’, (2020) 395 The Lancet 664.
165 Trygve Ottersen, Steven J Hoffman and Gaelle Groux, ‘Ebola again shows the Interna-
tional Health Regulations are broken: What can be done differently to prepare for the 
next pandemic?’ (2016) 42(2–3) American Journal of Law & Medicine 356 ; Sara E Davies, 
Adam Kamradt-Scott and Simon Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and 
Global Health Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015) 103.
166 unsc, Peace and Security in Africa, sc Res 2177, 7268th mtg (18 September 2014) [3–4] (‘sc 
Res 2177’).
167 African Union, Assembly of the Union, Decision on Ebola Virus Disease (evd) Outbreak, 
Assembly/au/Dec.553(xxic), 24th sess, 2015, [4].
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recently, in May 2018, South Africa reportedly declined to implement of travel 
restrictions in response to the outbreak of Ebola in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (drc), their National Institute for Communicable Diseases citing the 
fact that “the who does not recommend that any travel or trade restrictions be 
applied to the drc.”168
The above analysis of state practice suggests a lack of ‘clear,’ ‘specific’ or 
consistent practice in the application of additional health measures by states 
that could assist in the interpretation of Article 43. Most states follow the 
provisions of Article 43 most of the time.169 While some states implement 
additional health measures that may not be commensurate with public 
health risks, such actions have generally been met with disapproval by other 
states.
4.2 Subsequent Agreement of States as Expressed through ihr Review 
Committees and through the wha
According to the ilc, the “pronouncements” – that is, the relevant factual and 
normative assessments170 – of an expert treaty body may “give rise to” or “refer 
to” a subsequent agreement by the Parties which establishes their understand-
ing of a treaty under Articles 31(3)(a) and 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, 
though this result is not easily achieved in practice.171 More commonly, such 
pronouncements may give rise to, or refer to, subsequent practice under Arti-
cle 32 (i.e., serve as a supplementary means of interpretation).172 An “expert 
treaty body”, per the ilc’s conclusion above, must be composed of members 
who serve in their personal capacity, meaning that they “are not subject to in-
structions when they act” in their capacity as an expert.173 The expert treaty 
body must also have competence which is authorized by a treaty.174
In the context of the ihr, the expert committees foreseen by this legal in-
strument would be equivalent or at least analogous to the expert treaty bodies 
referred to by the ilc. Under Article 50, who’s director-general may establish 
168 sa declines to issue travel restriction to drc, saying Ebola is in ‘very remote area’ Business 
Day (11 May 2018) <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/health/2018-05-11-sa-de 
clines-to-issue-travel-restriction-to-drc-saying-ebola-outbreak-is-in-very-remote-area/>.
169 This specific claim is analogous to Louis Henkin’s more general claim that “[a]lmost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obliga-
tions almost all the time.” Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 
(Council on Foreign Relation, 2nd ed, 1979) 47.
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a Review Committee composed of members from the ihr Expert Roster and, 
when appropriate, other who expert advisory panels.175 Such a Review Com-
mittee is expressly authorized by the ihr to serve in an advisory role to the 
director-general, and may be asked to carry out one or more of the following 
tasks: (a) make technical recommendations regarding amendments to the 
ihr; (b) provide technical advice to the director-general with respect to stand-
ing recommendations; and (c) provide technical advice on any matter referred 
to it regarding the functioning of the ihr.176 Article 50(2) further specifies that 
“the Review Committee shall be considered an expert committee” and subject 
to the who Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and Committees (“who Ad-
visory Panel Regulations”).177 Several provisions within the latter document, 
such as the prohibition against receiving remuneration from who, and the 
ban against receiving instructions from any external authority, suggest that ex-
perts serving such committees are doing so in their personal capacity.178
The ihr Emergency Committee is another expert committee explicitly fore-
seen and mandated by the ihr.179 Like the Review Committee, it is established 
by the director-general, but limited in duration and scope.180 Unlike the Re-
view Committee, however, no provision in the ihr subjects the Emergency 
Committee to Advisory Panel Regulations.
The ihr clarifies that the views of a Review Committee “shall not commit 
the Organization and shall be formulated as advice to the director-general” and 
that the views of an Emergency Committee are to be forwarded to the director-
general, who “shall make the final determination” on matters pertaining to its 
competence.181 This does not preclude the possibility, however, that the pro-
nouncements of either body may give rise to, or refer to, a subsequent agree-
ment by the ihr’s states parties which establishes their understanding regard-
ing the interpretation of the ihr. To be of assistance in treaty  interpretation, 
pronouncements made by expert treaty bodies need not be legally binding.182
175 ihr, above n 4, art 50(3).
176 Ibid art 50(1).
177 Ibid art 50(2).
178 who, Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and Committees, arts 3.4, 4.6 ; Unni Gopina-
than, Steven J Hoffman and Trygve Ottersen, ‘Scientific Advisory Committees at the World 
Health Organization: A Qualitative Study of How Their Design Affects Quality, Relevance, 
and Legitimacy’ (2018) 2(9) Global Challenges 1; Unni Gopinathan and Steven J Hoffman, 
‘Institutionalizing an Evidence-Informed Approach to Guideline Development: Progress 
and Challenges at the World Health Organization’ (2018) 3(5) bmj Global Health 1.
179 ihr, above n 4, arts 48–49.
180 Ibid art 48(2).
181 Ibid arts 52(1), 49(5).
182 ilc Study on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice, above n 29, 109.
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Rather, the weight accorded to such pronouncements depends on whether 
it can be said that the pronouncement “gave rise to” or “referred to” subsequent 
practice or subsequent agreement of the parties. The ilc has explained that 
one of the ways such pronouncements may be identified is by examining the 
“resolutions of organs of international organizations”.183 Such resolutions and 
decisions, when adopted by consensus under the auspices of an international 
organization, may also serve as a supplementary means of interpretation un-
der the Vienna Convention.184
The who Constitution empowers three organs – the 194-member wha, the 
34-member Executive Board, and the secretariat – to carry out the work of 
the organization.185 Reports prepared by the ihr review committee are usually 
submitted for consideration at sessions of the wha and Executive Board. The 
reports that substantively discuss the application of Article 43 have arisen 
mainly in the context of two ihr Review Committee analyses of how these 
regulations functioned during the 2009 H1N1 and 2014–2016 Ebola outbreaks. 
Some assessments from the above-mentioned reports have formed the subject 
of resolutions and decisions at the wha. These report findings, and their sub-
sequent uptake in resolutions, are referenced below.
After the first pheic declared under the ihr, the international communi-
ty’s response to the H1N1 outbreak was studied in-depth by the ihr H1N1 Re-
view Committee. On the application of Article 43 specifically, the H1N1 Review 
Committee recommended that parties “reinforce evidence-based decisions on 
international travel and trade” and urged who to “energetically seek to ob-
tain the public-health rationale and relevant scientific information, share it 
with other States Parties, and, where appropriate, request reconsideration, as 
stipulated under Article 43.” It also recommended that who review and assess 
the effectiveness and impact of border measures taken during the outbreak to 
support evidence-based guidance for future events.186
While the H1N1 Review Committee acknowledged inherent problems in se-
curing compliance with travel and trade requirements under the ihr, it ulti-
mately called for more “rigorous implementation of Article 43, by both States 
Parties and who, rather than amending the ihr.”187 On 20 May 2011, the wha 
urged its member states to “support the implementation of the recommenda-
tions contained in the final report of the Review Committee on the  Functioning 
183 Ibid 111.
184 Ibid 33.
185 who Constitution, above n 3, art 9.
186 H1N1 Review Committee Report, above n 153, 130.
187 Ibid 81.
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of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009.”188
The West Africa Ebola outbreak, the severity and duration of which was 
widely regarded as having challenged the ihr in “unprecedented ways”,189 pro-
vided a second opportunity for an in-depth review of the interpretation of 
 Article 43 in practice. Unlike H1N1, which occurred in the early phases of ihr 
implementation, the Ebola outbreak emerged at a time when parties had al-
ready overseen at least two major public health situations (i.e., H1N1 and 
mers) and would have been more seasoned in the implementation of Article 
43. Shortcomings in ihr operationalization and global solidarity led who’s Ex-
ecutive Board to call for the establishment of a panel of outside experts (the 
“Ebola Interim Assessment Panel”) to examine “all aspects of who’s response 
to the Ebola outbreak.”190 Subsequently, on 26 May 2015, the wha also called 
on who’s director-general to establish the Ebola Review Committee.191
Although both the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel and the Ebola Review 
Committee noted that at least 40 states implemented additional health mea-
sures that interfered significantly with international traffic without due regard 
for the procedural and scientific requirements under Article 43, there were 
key differences between the recommendations issued by the Panel and those 
suggested by the Committee. For instance, citing the severe economic conse-
quences that were borne by states affected by Ebola, as well as the barriers to 
receiving necessary personnel and supplies, the Panel called upon the Ebola 
Review Committee to examine the option of implementing disincentives and 
imposing sanctions on states that had adopted inappropriate or unjustified 
additional health measures under the ihr.192 This recommendation was sup-
ported by a separate High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises 
convened by the UN Secretary-General in 2015, which observed that “no fur-
ther action is currently outlined in ihr if a country introduces a measure that 
is not justified by scientific principles or evidence.” The UN Secretary- General’s 
High-Level Panel sought to rectify this gap by requesting that the who’s Ebola 
188 who, World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005), Doc No wha64/2011/rec/1, 64th assembly, 16–24 May 2011, [1].
189 Ebola Review Committee Report, above n 19, 8.
190 Panel of Independent Experts, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (July 2015), 
9 <https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/ebola-panel-report/en/> 
(‘ Ebola Interim Assessment Panel’).
191 who, World Health Assembly, 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak and follow-up to the Spe-
cial Session of the Executive Board on the Ebola Emergency, Doc No wha68/2015/rec/1, 
68th sess, 18–26 May 2015.
192 Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, above n 191, 12.
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Review Committee give consideration for “strengthening the review powers of 
the who and compensation in the event that trade and travel restrictions are 
determined to have exceeded the temporary recommendations of who with-
out adequate justification.”193
The Ebola Review Committee disagreed on this point, noting that the will of 
the states parties during intergovernmental negotiations in 2004 and 2005 was 
to avoid the inclusion of sanctions for non-compliance. Specifically, the Re-
view Committee opined that “the ethos that underpins international public 
health is one of cooperation and collaboration, rather than sanctions.”194 As 
with the H1N1 Review Committee, the predominant concern of the Ebola Re-
view Committee was the fact that “[i]n practice, very few countries inform the 
who about the implementation of additional measures and few justify or re-
consider enacted measures, even when asked to do so.”195 As a result, the Ebola 
Review Committee merely reminded states of their need to comply with all 
relevant ihr obligations when implementing international traffic and trade 
measures. The Review Committee’s recommendations to the who secretariat 
were more detailed and prescriptive, and called for the active monitoring of 
measures implemented by parties, as well as actions taken by nonstate actors, 
and analysis of public health rationales for such measures.196
Although the Ebola Review Committee did not find it within the spirit of 
the ihr to suggest including new disincentives or sanctions against states im-
plementing additional health measures, it recommended that the who secre-
tariat publish on its website additional health measures that go beyond tempo-
rary recommendations or which may have “an unreasonable adverse impact” 
on one or more ihr states parties, provided that the implementing state has 
either: (1) failed to notify who or provide details about such measures when 
requested; (2) failed to provide an adequate public health rationale; (3) failed 
to review such measures within three months; or (4) failed to reconsider them 
when requested to do so by the who secretariat.197 As an illustration of the 
ingenuity that these post-Ebola reflections generated, the Review Committee 
introduced wording (e.g., additional health measures with an “unreasonable 
adverse impact”) and conditions (e.g., states that fail to reconsider additional 
measures) that do not appear as such in the text of Article 43.
193 High Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises, Protecting humanity from 
 future health crises: Report of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises, 
ungaor, 70th sess, Agenda Item 125, UN Doc A/70/723, 9 February 2016, [227].
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The report of the Ebola Review Committee was well-received by the wha, 
which at its meeting in May 2016 requested who’s director-general to develop 
a global implementation plan for the Review Committee’s recommenda-
tions.198 Later approved by the wha on 26 May 2018, the five-year global imple-
mentation plan acknowledges that states’ compliance with additional health 
measure provisions under the ihr is “a critical element for the optimal func-
tioning of the global alert and response system, ” though it does not explicitly 
mention the need for states to publish additional health measures implement-
ed where these health measures interfere significantly with international traf-
fic, as per the criteria suggested in the final report of the Ebola Review 
Committee.199
On 17 July 2019, on the recommendation of the ihr Emergency Commit-
tee, the director-general declared the Ebola outbreak in the drc as the fifth 
pheic since the entry into force of the ihr. Referring to the exceptionally 
harsh nature of the lessons learned from the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa, the Emergency Committee cautioned that “the global communi-
ty should anticipate possible negative consequences and proactively prevent 
them from occurring”.200 This was followed by a statement from the director-
general, who urged the international community not to use the pheic “to 
stigmatize and penalize the very people who are most in need of our help”.201 
Calls against stigma and discrimination have been repeated during covid-19, 
both by the director-general, and the UN Secretary-General.202
The practice of states as discerned through the recommendations of the 
ihr Review and Emergency Committees, and the adoption of decisions and 
198 who, World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005), Doc No wha69/2016/rec/1, 69th sess, 23–28 May 2016, [2].
199 wha Decision 71(15), above n 20, [22–23].
200 who, Emergency Committee, Statement on the meeting of the International Health Regu-
lations (2005) Emergency Committee for Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo on 17 July 2019 <https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/statement-emergency-com 
mittee-ebola-drc-july-2019.pdf>.
201 who, Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo declared a Public Health Emer-
gency of International Concern <https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/17-07-2019-eb 
ola-outbreak-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-declared-a-public-health-emer 
gency-of-international-concern>.
202 who, Statement on the second meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) 
Emergency Committee regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) <https://
www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the 
-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak 
-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)> ; UN, Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Re-
sponding to the socio-economic impacts of covid-19 (2020) <https://www.un.org/sites/un2 
.un.org/files/sg_report_socio-economic_impact_of_covid19.pdf>.
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resolutions through the wha, confirms several aspects of Article 43’s ordinary-
meaning analysis in Section 3. It confirms that additional health measures 
must be “evidence-based”203 and that the provision of a public health rationale 
is not a mere formality but rather a mandatory requirement which must be 
“adequate.”204
Analysis of subsequent agreements of states moreover suggests that certain 
additional health measures may be rendered impermissible under Article 43, 
or at minimum subject to review by the who, on the basis of their “unreason-
able adverse impact” on other states.205 While this term is not explicitly used 
in the text of Article 43, it is consistent with the requirement under Article 3 of 
the ihr that the implementation of the regulations “be guided by the goal of 
their universal application for the protection of all people of the world from 
the international spread of disease,”206 and it is consistent with the principle 
elaborated under Article 2 to avoid any “unnecessary” interference with inter-
national traffic and trade.207
4.3 Conclusion on Subsequent Practice and Subsequent Agreement in 
the Application of Article 43
Subsequent state practice usually provides helpful interpretive insight into 
whether parties have agreed upon certain meanings of terms and obligations 
of an international legal instrument. In the case of the ihr, however, experi-
ences with H1N1, Ebola and COVID-19 reveal inconsistencies and a fractured 
consensus in the types of additional health measures permitted. States that did 
implement additional health measures also demonstrated an overall lack of 
compliance with (and sometimes a lack of awareness for) their obligation to 
report any additional health measures to who and provide a public health ra-
tionale where those measures interfere significantly with international traffic. 
Yet, despite these areas of inconsistent state practice among a minority of 
states, it appears that most states observe most aspects of Article 43 most of 
the time.
wha resolutions adopted by states in response to pheics have overwhelm-
ingly expressed disapproval when additional health measures have exceeded 
temporary recommendations issued by who’s director-general and negatively 
203 H1N1 Review Committee Report, above n 153, [28].
204 Ebola Review Committee Report, above n 19, 66.
205 Ibid 66.
206 ihr, above n 4, art 3(3).
207 Ibid art 2.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2021 04:04:02PM
via free access
 45Clarifying IHR Article 43 | 10.1163/15723747-2020023
<UN>
international organizations law review (2020) 1-68
impacted the populations and economies of affected countries.208 This sug-
gests that, in addition to the Article 43(1) requirement for measures to be no 
more restrictive to international traffic and no more intrusive and invasive to 
persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appro-
priate level of health protection, states must also factor into their decision 
making the real and tangible harm that might result from the implementation 
of any additional health measures that are not rooted in public health 
evidence.
5 Insights from Other Rules of International Law
In addition to the Vienna Convention’s requirement to interpret a treaty through 
an analysis of its broader normative environment, 209 the ihr contains several 
references to obligations under other international law instruments within its 
text. Notably, Article 57 of the ihr explicitly states that “the ihr and other 
relevant international agreements should be interpreted so as to be compati-
ble.” In the event of conflict, the provision clarifies that “the ihr shall not affect 
the rights and obligations of any State Party deriving from other international 
agreements”.210
The ihr’s relationship with other international instruments was a signifi-
cant point of debate for states during negotiations. Some states expressed con-
cern that the subject-matter of the ihr would overlap with issues covered by 
other instruments of international law.211 The WHO responded by commission-
ing a review which highlighted two principles of treaty drafting and interpreta-
tion relevant for the ihr: (1) the principle of “mutual supportiveness” between 
treaties and the presumption against conflicts; and (2) the principle of not 
adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations provided by other trea-
ties.212 This means that Article 43 must be interpreted in light of other regimes 
208 who, World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005), above n 198, [2]; who, World Health Assembly, Implementation of the Internation-
al Health Regulations (2005), Doc No wha64/2011/rec/1, 64th Sess, 2011, [1].
209 ihr, above n 4, art 31(3)(c).
210 Ibid art 57(1).
211 Tigerstrom, above n 13, 55.
212 who, Intergovernmental Working Group on Revision of the International Health Regula-
tions, Review and approval of proposed amendments to the International Health Regula-
tions: relations with other international instruments, Doc No A/ihr/igwg/inf.Doc./1, 30 
September 2004 [5] (‘igwg – Relation with other international instruments’).
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of international law that may be affected by the implementation of additional 
health measures. Two regimes are particularly relevant to this endeavour – (1) 
international human rights law and (2) international trade law.
5.1 International Human Rights Law
Whether it involves quarantine or isolation, the imposition of intrusive or in-
vasive medical procedures, the handling of personal information, the destruc-
tion of personal property, or restrictions on the freedom of movement, the 
implementation of an additional health measure under Article 43 may lead to 
state limitations to, or derogations from, human rights and freedoms protected 
by international human rights instruments and enshrined in customary inter-
national law. For example, affected rights could include: the right to liberty and 
security of the person under Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (udhr), and Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (iccpr); the liberty of movement under Article 13 of the udhr 
and Article 12 of the iccpr; and the right to privacy under Article 12 of the 
udhr and Article 17 of the iccpr.213 The iccpr is legally-binding upon 172 
parties. The udhr, although not legally binding, is widely regarded as reflect-
ing customary international law.214
Rights and freedoms analogous to the above examples from the udhr and 
iccpr are contained in various additional international and regional human 
rights treaties and related protocols, including the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Mi-
grant Workers and Members of their Families, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights. 
Table 1 provides a non-exhaustive overview of these analogous rights and free-
doms across relevant international and regional treaties and protocols.
Although Article 57 of the ihr explicitly gives precedence to state obliga-
tions arising from other international legal instruments, it was decided dur-
ing the drafting of the ihr that the “formulation of… ‘qualified’ rights [would] 
213 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ga Res 217 (iii), ungaor, 3rd sess, Supp No 13, arts 
3, 12 and 13 (‘udhr’) ; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for sig-
nature 16 December 1966, 999 unts 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 9(1), 12, 17 
(‘iccpr’).
214 Hurst Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law’ (1998) 25(1–2) The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 287, 323.
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Table 1 The right to liberty and security of the person, right to freedom of movement and the right to 




Alternative Human  
Rights Treaty or Protocol
Analogous Provision in Treaty or Protocol
Right to liberty 
and security of 
the person
art. 9
African Charter of Human 
and People’s Rights, 1981
Right to liberty and to the security of one’s 
person; freedom from arbitrary arrest or 
detention
Art. 6
American Convention on 
Human Rights, 1969
Right to personal liberty and security, 
including freedom from arbitrary arrest or 
detention
Art. 7
European Convention on 
Human Rights, 1950
Right to liberty and security Art. 5
Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 1989
Freedom from unlawful or arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty, arrest or detention
Art. 37
International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, 
1990
Right to liberty and security of the person; 





African Charter of Human 
and People’s Rights, 1981
Right to freedom of movement and 
residence within the borders of a State; 
Right to leave any country including one’s 
own and to return to one’s country; Right to 
asylum in case of persecution; Prohibition 
of mass expulsions
Art. 12
American Convention on 
Human Rights, 1969
Right to freedom of movement and 
residence
Art. 22
Additional Protocol No. 4 of 
1963 to the European 
Convention on Human 
Rights
Right to freedom of movement and of 
residence; the right to leave any country, 
including one’s own
Art. 2
Right to freedom of movement and of 
residence; the right to leave any country, 
including one’s own
Art. 3
Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 1989
Right to enter or leave a state for the 
purpose of familial reunification
Art. 10









Alternative Human  
Rights Treaty or Protocol
Analogous Provision in Treaty or Protocol
International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, 
1990
Freedom to leave any state, including the 
state of origin
Art. 8
Right to liberty of movement in the 
territory of the state of employment and 
freedom to choose residence there
Art. 39
Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 
2008
Right to liberty of movement, to freedom to 





African Charter of Human 
and People’s Rights, 1981
Right to respect for life and integrity of the 
person
Art. 4
American Convention on 
Human Rights, 1969
Right to privacy Art. 11
European Convention on 
Human Rights, 1950
Right to respect for private and family life Art. 8
Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 1989
Freedom from arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with privacy, family, home or 
correspondence; freedom from unlawful 
attacks on honour and reputation
Art. 16
International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, 
1990
Freedom from arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with privacy, family home, 
correspondence, or other communications; 
freedom from unlawful attacks on honour 
and reputation
Art. 14
Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 
2008
Freedom from arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with privacy, family, or 
correspondence, or other types of 
communication; freedom from unlawful 
attacks on honour and reputation
Art. 22
Table 1 The right to liberty and security of the person, right to freedom (cont.)
†This table is intended to illustrate the complex and interdependent relationship between the individual 
rights affected by ihr Article 43 and international and regional human rights treaties. It is not an exhaustive 
or comprehensive representation of the rights and freedoms affected by the ihr and protected by interna-
tional and regional human rights treaties.
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 allow for a better synergy between the draft Regulations and the [iccpr].”215 
As a result, the current ihr regulates the implementation of health measures 
in a manner that renders such implementation consistent with human rights 
obligations and especially those rights and freedoms contained in the iccpr. 
Broadly speaking, this means that the implementation of the ihr must be un-
dertaken with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental free-
doms of persons216 and must adhere to the principle of non-discrimination.217 
Consideration for civil rights reappears again under Article 23 of the ihr, re-
quiring states to obtain express informed consent prior to carrying out any 
“medical examination, vaccination, prophylaxis or health measure” on a travel-
er upon their arrival or departure;218 under Article 42 of the General Provisions 
(Part viii), which requires that health measures be “initiated and completed 
without delay” and applied in a transparent manner;219 and under Article 45, 
which calls for the confidentiality and appropriate handling of health informa-
tion collected or received by a state pursuant to the ihr.220 These provisions 
must be taken into account when implementing additional health measures 
under Article 43, since all additional health measures must be “otherwise con-
sistent” with the ihr.221
Except for non-derogable rights such as the right to life, the right to be 
free from torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment,222 and the 
 requirement to treat all travelers with courtesy and respect, taking into con-
sideration their gender, sociocultural, ethnic or religious concerns,223 certain 
circumstances may justify limiting the rights explicitly referred to under the 
ihr. For instance, the requirement to obtain express informed consent prior 
to carrying out any intrusive or invasive medical examination, prophylaxis or 
vaccination is waived in cases where there is evidence of an “imminent public 
health threat” posed by the traveler.224 Evidence of an imminent public health 
threat may also justify placing travelers under isolation, quarantine or public 
health observation, although such measures must withstand the scientific as-
sessment prescribed by Article 43(2).225
215 igwg – Relation with other international instruments, above n 212, [30].
216 ihr, above n 4, arts 3(1), 32.
217 Ibid art 42.
218 Ibid art 23(3).
219 Ibid art 42.
220 Ibid art 45.
221 Ibid art 43(1).
222 iccpr, above n 213, art 4(2).
223 Ibid art 32.
224 Ibid art 31(2).
225 Ibid art 31(2)(c).
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Given that the ihr was written with the intention to be compatible with 
 international human rights law, a closer look at limitations and derogations 
under this regime is also warranted. Article 29(2) of the udhr explicitly ac-
knowledges the possibility of limitations to the enjoyment of prescribed rights 
and freedoms where limitations are “determined by law solely for the purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society”.226 Unlike limitations, a  derogation 
leads to a full suspension of the right in question in a state of emergency. In 
this regard, Article 4 of the iccpr provides that “in time of public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed”, states may derogate from obligations under this instrument.227 
Other international and regional human rights treaties also contain explicit 
limitation and derogation clauses justifying the curtailment or suspension of 
analogous rights and freedoms under limited circumstances. Table 2 provides 
a non-exhaustive overview of limitations and derogations clauses contained in 
international and regional human rights treaties.
During public health crises, the appropriateness of state encroachment 
on human rights hinges upon interlinking criteria widely applied by in-
ternational courts and tribunals as generally accepted principles of law: 
(1) the state measure has a legitimate aim (principle of “legitimacy”); (2) the 
state measure is necessary for the achievement of the legitimate aim (prin-
ciple of “necessity”); and (3) the state measure is proportional, in temporal, 
geographic and territorial scope, to the legitimate aim pursued (principle of 
“proportionality”).228,229
While the above principles are not applied in the same manner by ev-
ery international court or tribunal, some variation of the above is used. For 
example, proportionality was a key consideration for the Human Rights 
Committee (“Committee”) in the 2018 case of Vandom v Republic Korea. 
The Complainant in this case, an English teacher working in South Korea, ar-
gued that the state’s mandatory hiv test violated her right to privacy (among 
226 udhr, above n 213, art 29(2).
227 iccpr, above n 213, art 4.
228 Nicolas aj Croquet, The Role and Extent of a Proportionality Analysis in the Judicial Assess-
ment of Human Rights Limitations within International Criminal Proceedings (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2015) 28–33.
229 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, ‘Proportionality’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (oup, 2013) 449 ; Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, art 38(1).
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Table 2 Derogation and limitation clauses in major human rights treaties
Classification Justifying 
reasons












all rights except for:
right to life;
right to a name;
right to juridical 
personality;
right to nationality;
freedom from torture and 
inhumane treatment;
freedom from slavery, 
slave-trade and servitude;
right to not be imprisoned 
for contractual debt;
respect for the principle of 
legality in the field of 
criminal law;
freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion;






















































Arts. 12, 19, 21, 
22 iccpr;
Arts. 8–11 echr;
Art. 2 Additional 
Protocol No. 4 to 
echr;
Arts. 12, 13, 15, 
16, 22 achr;
Arts. 5 and 8 
Additional 
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other rights) protected under the iccpr. In deciding that the measure was an 
unjustified violation of the right to privacy, the Committee carefully studied 
the scientific literature, and noted that there is “no evidence…that hiv restric-
tions on entry, stay and residence based on positive hiv status alone serve to 
protect the public health, but rather that such restrictions may harm public 
health.”230 In considering the state’s argument that the policy had the purpose 
of maintaining public health and order, the Committee therefore observed 
that:
the State party ha[d] not provided any justification for how the imposi-
tion of the mandatory hiv/aids and drug testing policy on the specific 
group of E-2 visa holders and applicants would have been in the further-
ance of protecting public health and maintaining public order, or could 








the rights and 
freedoms of 
others
Arts. 10, 13, 15 
crc;
Arts. 8, 13, 39 
icrmw
‡echr: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 
November 1950; esc: European Social Charter, Turin, 18 December 1961, revised Strasbourg, 3 May 1996; 
Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing 
certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the first Protocol 
thereto, Strasbourg, 16 November 1963; iccpr: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New 
York, 16 December 1966; achr: American Convention on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969; 
achpr: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Nairobi, 27 June 1981; Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, San Salvador, 
16 November 1999; crc: Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989; icrmw: 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, New York, 18 November 1990.
Adapted from Stefania Negri, “Communicable disease control”, in Gian Luca Burci and Brigit Toebes (eds.), 
Research Handbook on Global Health Law, Edward Elgar, 2018.
Table 2 Derogation and limitation clauses in major human rights treaties (cont.)
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otherwise be justified as reasonable in the circumstances of the case, es-
pecially considering the fact that teachers of Korean ethnicity and na-
tionality were exempted from the policy.231
Similar reasoning for deviations from rights prescribed by the iccpr are 
also detailed in the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Pro-
visions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Siracusa 
Principles”).232 Non-binding but authoritative, the Siracusa Principles explic-
itly call for “due regard” to the ihr233 and foresee limitations to an iccpr ob-
ligation on public health grounds where a state must take measures to deal 
with “a serious threat to the health of a population or individual members of 
the population”. Such measures, however, must be “specifically aimed at pre-
venting disease or injury or providing care for the sick and injured.”234 Any 
derogation from rights, according to the Siracusa Principles, must be restricted 
in severity, duration and geographic scope to that which is necessary to deal 
with the threat to the life of the nation and proportionate to its nature and 
extent,235 and it must nevertheless refrain from discriminating solely on the 
basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.236
The text of Article 43 complements the principles of legitimacy, necessity 
and proportionality. Where Article 43(2) requires the state to undertake an as-
sessment of the scientific evidence underpinning the utility of an additional 
health measure, it responds to the requirement under human rights law to 
demonstrate that a measure limiting or derogating from human rights is neces-
sary. Where Article 43(1) seeks to implement measures that are not more intru-
sive to persons than reasonably available alternatives, the principle of propor-
tionality is activated. Specific public health risks and pheics may well give rise 
to legitimate aims.
That travel and trade restrictions must be commensurate with the risk 
posed to public health is a principle that was also recognized by the UN Secu-
rity Council during the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Shortly after 
who’s director-general declared this pheic, the UN Security Council issued 
Resolution 2177 of 18 September 2014, in which it expressed “concern about the 
231 Ibid.
232 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation 
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 




236 iccpr, above n 213, art 4(1).
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detrimental effect of the isolation of the affected countries as a result of trade 
and travel restrictions” and called on states to “lift general travel and border 
restrictions…that contribute to the further isolation of affected countries and 
undermine their efforts to respond to the Ebola outbreak.”237
All of this means that, where additional health measures contemplated un-
der Article 43 pose a risk to the enjoyment of rights protected by international 
and regional human rights treaties, states must assess planned measures not 
only against the general Article 43(1) limitations on their implementation and 
the Article 43(2) requirement for scientific justification, but also against their 
human rights obligations, including the principles of legitimacy, necessity, and 
proportionality.
5.2 International Trade Law
The broad subject matter of the ihr overlaps to some degree with the interna-
tional law on trade in goods. Currently, 160 states parties to the ihr are also 
members of the wto.238 Considerable effort was made during negotiations to 
ensure that obligations under other international legal agreements would ei-
ther be harmonized with or remain unaffected by the revised ihr. With re-
spect to the international trade law regime specifically, drafters altered certain 
provisions of the ihr to render them mutually compatible.239 These include 
obligations prescribed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) 
and the wto Sanitary and Phytosanitary (sps) Agreement, which include pro-
visions analogous to Article 43 of the ihr in both scope and objective but spe-
cifically addressing measures for attenuating the risk of animal or plant- carried 
diseases in the context of international trade.240
Like with human rights, the international trade law regime can be a source 
of interpretation according to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention and 
can lend aid in interpreting terms and expressions that lack definition under 
237 sc Res. 2177, above n 166, [3–5].
238 The following states and territories are parties to the ihr only (and not Members of the 
wto): Algeria, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Comoros Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Holy See, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kiribati, Lebanon, 
Libya, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Niue, Palau, San 
Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Somalia South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Repub-
lic, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.
239 igwg – Relation with other international instruments, above n 212, [8–9].
240 wto Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, opened for 
signature 15 April 1994, 1867 unts 493 (entered into force 1 January 1995) art 1 (‘sps 
Agreement’).
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the ihr – such as “scientific principles,”241 “available scientific evidence, ”242 
and “reasonably available alternatives”.243 While wto instruments do not 
share the ihr’s primary focus on public health, the resolution of wto disputes 
involving these same terms in the gatt and the sps Agreement can serve as 
an interpretive aid. In other words, while decisions of wto’s Dispute Resolu-
tion Panels and Appellate Body are not directly applicable to the ihr and may 
not be the most authoritative interpretation of international law broadly, they 
are nonetheless authoritative in their own domain and the logic that adjudica-
tors employ in those cases can inform arguments that who, states, and/or the 
icj could seize upon in similar matters involving similar terms found in the 
ihr’s  Article 43. Specifically, wto disputes have provided guidance on, among 
other subjects: (1) whether a measure is “necessary” and how to contend with 
“reasonably available alternatives”; (2) what constitutes “sufficient scientific 
evidence”; and (3) whether the precautionary principle can be used to justify 
the use of protective measures in situations of uncertainty. In the subsections 
that follow, wto Panel and Appellate Body decisions are used to assist in the 
interpretation of these terms and concepts.
5.2.1 On the Necessity of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and 
Reasonably Available Alternatives
Article xx(b) of the gatt explicitly allows members to take measures that 
would otherwise violate their gatt obligations if such measures are “nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”244 The provision is 
subject to the general condition in the chapeau of Article xx, which re-
quires that such matters not be applied “…in a manner which would consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.”245
In the European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products case (2000) (“ec/Asbestos”), Canada challenged France’s 
ban on asbestos and products containing asbestos fibres, claiming that chryso-
tile asbestos-cement products did not present a high enough risk to warrant 
a ban and that non-scientific and illegitimate factors influenced the  decision 
241 ihr, above n 4, art 43(2)(a).
242 Ibid art 43(2)(b).
243 Ibid art 43(1).
244 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 1947, 55 unts 
194 (entered into force 1 January 1948) art xx(b) (‘gatt’).
245 Ibid art xx.





international organizations law review (2020) 1-68
to implement the measure.246 The Panel and Appellate Body considered 
whether the measure was “necessary to protect human…life or health” as per 
Article xx(b). The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that chryso-
tile-cement products posed a risk to human health – noting that the Panel’s 
conclusion was in keeping with the consensus in views expressed by multi-
ple  scientists and international bodies such as the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer, and the WHO.247 The Appellate Body also opined that a 
country should be able to choose from among the “reasonably available” alter-
natives that serve their chosen health policy goal or objective, 248 and that the 
more vital or important the objective pursued, the easier it would be to deem 
the selected measure as being “necessary” to meet those ends.249
The Appellate Body in Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres 
(2007) followed the decision in ec/Asbestos in acknowledging the importance 
of the objective of preserving human life and health against the threat of dis-
ease. It also noted, however, that other factors would have to be considered 
when determining whether a measure is necessary, including the interests or 
values at stake, their relative importance, as well as the availability of reason-
able alternative measures.250
5.2.2 On the Sufficiency of Scientific Evidence and the Nature of Risk 
Assessment
Article 2.1 of the sps Agreement further reaffirms that wto members “have the 
right to enact sanitary and phytosanitary…measures that are necessary for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health” provided such measures 
are otherwise consistent with the sps Agreement.251 Under Article 2.2, such 
measures must be applied “only to the extent necessary to protect human…
life or health, based on scientific principles” and “must not be maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of 
Article 5”.252
246 Tracey Epps, ‘The facts of the health cases’ in Cheltenham International Trade and Health 
Protection: A Critical Assessment of the wto’s sps Agreement (UK: Edward Elgar, 2008) 202, 
207.
247 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
 Asbestos- Containing Products (wto Doc wt/ds135/ab/R, 5 April 2001) [162].
248 Ibid [174].
249 Ibid [172].
250 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyre (wto Doc 
wt/ds322/ab/R, 17 December 2007) [178].
251 sps Agreement, above n 240, art 2.1.
252 Ibid art 2.2.
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In Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (1999) (“Japan/Agricul-
tural Products”), both the Panel and Appellate Body agreed that the require-
ment for “sufficient scientific evidence” under Article 2.2 requires a rational or 
objective relationship between the sps measure and scientific evidence.253 
This principle was re-iterated again in Japan – Measures Affecting the Importa-
tion of Apples (2003) (“Japan/Apples”). The Appellate Body in Japan/Apples 
also distinguished, however, between “scientific uncertainty” (i.e., where di-
verging conclusions may each be supported by a degree of scientific evidence) 
and “scientific insufficiency.”254 Relevant scientific evidence, according to the 
Appellate Body, would be considered insufficient if it “does not allow, in quali-
tative or quantitative terms, for the performance of an adequate assessment of 
risks as required under Article 5.1.”255
Article 5 of the sps Agreement, entitled “Assessment of Risk and Determi-
nation of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection,” is in-
trinsically tied with Article 2. Under Article 5.1, measures must be based on an 
“assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human…life or 
health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the rele-
vant international organizations”.256 As pronounced by the Appellate Body in 
European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones) (1998) (“ec-Hormones”), Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should be constantly read 
in tandem, with Article 5.1 being “a specific application of the basic obligations 
contained in Article 2.2 of the sps Agreement”.257 Consequently, in Australia – 
Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (1998), the Appellate Body con-
firmed that if an sps measure was not based on a risk assessment, it would be 
presumed not to be based on scientific principles or sufficient scientific evi-
dence either.258
The term “risk assessment” has specific meaning within the framework of 
the sps Agreement, referring to:
[t]he evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a…. 
disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the 
253 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (wto Doc 
wt/ds76/ab/R, 19 March 1999) [84] (‘Japan/Agricultural Products’).
254 Ibid [184].
255 Ibid [179].
256 sps Agreement, above n 240, art 5.1.
257 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones) (wto Doc wt/ds26/ab/R, wt/ds48/ab/R, 13 February 1998) [180] 
(‘ec Hormones’).
258 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (wto Doc 
wt/ds18/rw, 6 November 1998) [138].
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sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the 
associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the eval-
uation of the potential for adverse effects on human…health arising from 
the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organ-
isms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.259
In ec-Hormones, the Panel and Appellate Body both found that the measures 
taken by the European Communities were not based on risk assessment as 
prescribed under Article 5.1 of the sps Agreement. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel’s test that, to affirm that a sanitary 
measure was “based on a risk assessment,” there had to be a rational relation-
ship between two sets of conclusions: on one hand, the scientific conclusions 
implicit in the sanitary measure, and on the other, the scientific conclusions 
arrived at through risk assessment.260 To this observation, the Appellate Body 
added: “the results of risk assessment must sufficiently warrant – that is to say, 
reasonably support – the sps measure at stake.”261 It noted, however, that the 
exercise of risk assessment under Article 5.1 does not have to come “to a mono-
lithic conclusion that coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit 
in the sps measure” but could also take on diverging scientific opinions.262 
The scientific evidence used to support additional measures is not required to 
represent majority or mainstream scientific opinions.263 The evidence must 
 nevertheless be grounded in scientific studies and represent more than an 
opinion.264 The icj supported a similar framework in the Whaling in the Ant-
arctic (2014) case by assessing whether elements of Japan’s whaling program 
were reasonably connected to its stated scientific objectives, though the icj 
ultimately declined to define what qualified as ‘scientific research’.265
While the Appellate Body in ec-Hormones generally agreed with the Panel’s 
observation that a risk assessment entailed a scientific process “characterized 
by systematic, disciplined and objective enquiry and analysis”,266 it disagreed 
with the conclusion that risk assessment “excluded all matters not susceptible 
to quantitative analysis by empirical or experimental laboratory methods 
259 sps Agreement, above n 240, Annex A.
260 ec Hormones, above n 257, [193].
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid; Japan/Agricultural Products, above n 253, [194].
263 ec Hormones, above n 257, [194].
264 Ibid [194], [198].
265 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening) ( Judgement) [2014] 
icj Rep 226, [88].
266 ec Hormones, above n 257, [187].
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commonly associated with physical sciences”. Instead, it opted for a more flex-
ible view of risk assessment that not only involved “a risk ascertainable in a 
science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk 
in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential 
for adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and 
work and die”.267
5.2.3 On the Precautionary Principle
In the context of public health decisions, the precautionary principle encour-
ages states to adopt precautionary measures when knowledge of a potential 
risk or hazard is uncertain – especially when the stakes are considered to be 
high.268 Some states have justified the implementation of measures exceed-
ing available scientific evidence by citing the precautionary principle. In the 
ec-Hormones case, the European Communities argued that the precaution-
ary principle was implied under Article 5.7 of the sps Agreement and that, 
in any event, it ought to be expanded since it has crystallized into custom-
ary international law. The Appellate Body hesitated to pronounce on the latter 
contention, but noted that the precautionary principle had not been explicitly 
written into the sps Agreement as a grounds for justifying measures that go be-
yond prescribed limits in the sps Agreement.269 The Appellate Body acknowl-
edged that Article 3.3 of the sps Agreement explicitly recognizes the right of 
parties to establish their own level of sanitary protection, but cautioned that 
such a right was not meant to eliminate the risk assessment exercise provided 
for under Article 5.1.270
5.2.4 Implications for Article 43
Several rules emerging from an analysis of wto Panel and Appellate Body 
decisions may serve as interpretive aids for ihr’s Article 43. First, before im-
plementing additional health measures, states must consider whether there 
is a rational relationship between the measure being implemented and the 
scientific principles and available scientific evidence cited to support them. 
Second, scientific evidence may be derived from minority or non-dominant 
scientific experts, but the evidence must represent more than just an opinion 
and must consist of a bona fide scientific risk assessment exercise. Third, in 
267 ec Hormones, above n 257, [187].
268 Didier Bourguignon, The Precautionary Principle: Definitions, Applications and Gover-
nance (In-Depth Analysis, No pe 573.876, December 2015) 4 <http://www.europarl.euro 
pa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/573876/EPRS_IDA(2015)573876_EN.pdf>.
269 ec Hormones, above n 257, [124].
270 Ibid [172], [176].
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determining whether a measure is necessary to achieve a stated objective, the 
measure must contribute substantially to the objective. Alternatives will be 
deemed as ‘reasonably available’ if they practically serve the level of health 
protection chosen by a state and are not simply alternatives ‘in theory’. Finally, 
a process of risk assessment is not merely a formality; states can err on the side 
of caution during risk assessment, but the exercise of risk assessment  itself – 
 prescribed by Article 43(2)(b) in the ihr – must be undertaken and must with-
stand scientific scrutiny.
5.3 Conclusion on Relevant Rules of International Law
The public health-focused ihr was expressly crafted to exist in synergy with 
the broader normative environment and align with states’ obligations under 
other regimes of international law. As a result, Article 43 sets limitations to ad-
ditional health measures by referring to language and concepts enshrined in 
international human rights law and international trade law. Indeed, interna-
tional human rights law provides a well-developed analytical framework based 
on the principles of legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality that can instruct 
states on when it may be appropriate to limit or derogate from their human 
rights obligations. Rules derived from wto case law can similarly provide in-
terpretive aid during states’ risk assessment exercises that must precede the 
adoption of additional health measures by clarifying terms (e.g., ‘scientific 
principles,’ ‘scientific evidence,’ and ‘reasonably available alternatives’) that 
have been the focus of extensive study in cases before the wto’s Panel and Ap-
pellate Body. The extent to which concepts from these other sources of inter-
national law are relevant for interpreting the ihr may generate debate and 
discussion. It is presumed, however, that treaties are not drafted and negotiat-
ed by states to be in normative conflict with one another. Even if not an au-
thoritative source of interpretation, case law from the wto may provide in-
valuable insight or logic, and it certainly qualifies as a supplementary means of 
interpretation under the Vienna Convention’s Article 32, and, arguably, a gen-
eral rule of interpretation under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention – 
since wto case law constitutes an authoritative expression of the obligations 
in force for wto members.
6 Practical Guidelines for Permissible Actions Under Article 43
In Section 3, a framework was developed based on an ordinary-meaning in-
terpretation of the ihr’s Article 43 to assist states and others in determining 
whether additional health measures under consideration would be  permissible 
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(see Figure 1). Section 4 canvassed subsequent state practice in the application 
of Article 43 both through states’ individual actions and as expressed through 
resolutions adopted through the wha. It demonstrated that while some states 
have applied Article 43 inconsistently, parties to the ihr remain committed, at 
least in rhetoric, to avoiding disruptions to international traffic and trade, par-
ticularly where additional health measures may cause harm to affected coun-
tries, and to mounting responses to the international spread of disease that are 
adequate, evidence-based and commensurate with public health risks. Sec-
tion 5 examined decisions issued by the wto Panel and Appellate Body, with a 
view to using these sources of case law to clarify the meaning of ‘scientific prin-
ciples,’ ‘sufficient scientific evidence,’ and ‘reasonably available alternatives’.
To demonstrate how this methodology-driven legal interpretation of Article 
43 may be put to practical use, concepts and meanings discussed above are ap-
plied to historical cases of the most common forms of additional health mea-
sures: (1) travel restrictions and health screening; (2) contact tracing and quar-
antine; and (3) restrictions applied to goods.
6.1 Travel Restrictions and Health Screening
During the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak, who’s director-general recommended 
that countries with Ebola transmission conduct exit screening at international 
airports, seaports, and major land crossings, and recommended that other 
countries avoid a general travel or trade ban.271
Despite pressures from the United States Congress to implement travel 
bans,272 the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (cdc’s) 
response to the Ebola outbreak involved communication to travelers (e.g., 
travel notices), provision of technical assistance to facilitate exit screening in 
countries affected by Ebola, and an entry risk assessment and management 
program for travelers to the United States from countries with Ebola out-
breaks.273 The entry risk assessment and management program, which began 
in October 2014, limited the entry of air travelers from Guinea, Libera, Sierra 
Leone and Mali to five airports where processes were used to identify travelers, 
administer an exposure-and-symptom questionnaire, compile details of their 
contacts, examine travelers’ temperatures with non-contact thermometers, 
271 Nicole J Cohen, ‘Travel and Border Health Measures to Prevent the International Spread 
of Ebola’ (2016) 65(3) mmwr Suppl, 57.
272 Michael McAuliff, ‘Lawmakers Ignore Experts, Push for Ebola Travel Ban’, Huffington Post 
(16 October 2014) <https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/10/16/congress-ebola_n_5997214.
html>.
273 Cohen, above n 271, 58.
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and observe travelers for signs of illness.274 Travelers who were symptomatic 
or who reported possible exposures received an in-depth public health risk 
assessment while symptomatic travelers meeting predefined criteria were 
 referred to receive medical attention. The program was discontinued for trav-
elers on 19 February 2016.275
Several factors render the health measures implemented by the United 
States during the Ebola outbreaks likely permissible under Article 43. First, 
measures sought to prevent the spread of disease in the United States while 
minimizing intrusiveness or invasiveness to persons, and specifically, by avoid-
ing travellers a delay of more than 24 hours.276 Rather than a direct travel ban, 
measures implemented by the cdc were specific and limited to that which is 
necessary to achieve the public health objective. The provision of technical 
assistance to conduct exit screening in affected countries, for instance, allowed 
the United States to contribute to disease containment at the source while also 
reassuring airlines that passengers are clear to travel. Exit screening was also 
found to be the health measure that interfered least with international traffic 
during the earlier H1N1 outbreak.277
In contrast, the Canadian government’s response to the Ebola outbreak in-
volved canceling and restricting visa applications for temporary and perma-
nent residence from anyone who was living in or had been to an Ebola-affected 
state within the previous three months. It also stopped processing visa applica-
tions from foreign nationals intending to travel to Ebola-affected states.278 
Though Canada did not wholly ban travel from Ebola-affected states, it made 
obtaining traveler visas virtually impossible – effectively halting all travel by 
non-Canadian citizens to the area.279 Indeed, since Canadian citizens traveling 
to or from West Africa were exempt from these visa restrictions, one American 
news media outlet even labelled Canada’s actions as “dumb, xenophobic and 
illegal.”280
There is no provision in the ihr which specifically speaks to the legiti-




277 Khan, above n 1, 370.
278 Tejpar and Hoffman, above n 68, 368.
279 Lorne Sossin, ‘Bureaucratic Disentitlement, Vulnerable People, and the Appeal of Review’ 
(2006) 56(4) The University of Toronto Law Journal, 389.
280 Julia Belluz, ‘Canada’s Ebola Visa Ban Is Dumb, Xenophobic, and Illegal’, Vox Media 
(5 November 2014) <https://www.vox.com/2014/11/5/7159705/canada-visa-ebola-virus 
-outbreak>.
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risk.  Nevertheless, Canada’s actions objectively qualified as additional health 
 measures exceeding the temporary recommendations issued by the who. 
Canada’s measures in response to Ebola were impermissible under Article 
43 for at least two reasons. First, these measures discriminatorily targeted 
non-Canadians. In doing so, they contravened Article 42 (i.e., the principle 
of  non-discrimination) and failed to be “otherwise consistent” with the ihr.281 
Second, when asked by the who to justify adopted measures, the Canadian 
government responded that its measures did not consist of a “general ban” – 
that is, Canadians involved in the humanitarian response were still free to 
travel to Ebola-affected states. Therefore, the government argued, measures 
did not violate who’s temporary recommendation against general bans.282 Yet 
the relevant question to ask under Article 43 is not whether a health measure 
contravenes temporary recommendations, but whether it achieves the same 
or greater levels of protection than temporary recommendations issued by the 
who. On this point, it is useful to note that the effectiveness of travel restric-
tions is unclear from an epidemiological perspective.283 Moreover, additional 
health measures must be no more restrictive to international traffic and more 
intrusive or invasive to persons than reasonably available alternatives that 
would achieve the same level of health protection. To achieve the public health 
objective of protecting Canadians from the risk of Ebola infection, the Cana-
dian government might have considered adopting measures similar to those 
implemented by their southern neighbours, where travelers were not barred 
from entry, but were rerouted to five major airports for screening – which it-
self would not have caused a significant interference with travel exceeding 24 
hours delay.
6.2 Contract Tracing and Quarantine
During the 2009 H1N1 outbreak that originated in Mexico, Chinese authori-
ties implemented a stringent and comprehensive set of health measures de-
signed to prevent the spread of the disease within local communities as well 
as at points of entry into the country. At the outset of the outbreak, China 
281 ihr, above n 4, art 43(1).
282 Helen Branswell, ‘who Objects to Canada’s Ban on Visas to Residents of Countries Af-
fected by Ebola’, IPolitics (9 November 2014) <http://ipolitics.ca/2014/11/09/ who-objects 
-to-canadas-visa-ban-for-countries-affected-by-ebola/>.
283 Ana lp Mateus et al, ‘Effectiveness of travel restrictions in the rapid containment of hu-
man influenza: A systematic review’ (2014) 92(12) Bulletin of the World Health Organiza-
tion 868, 873; Nicole A. Errett, Lauren M. Sauer & Lainie Rutkow, ‘An integrative review of 
the limited evidence on international travel bans as an emerging infectious disease disas-
ter control measure’ (2020) 18 Journal of Emergency Management 7–14.
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quarantined approximately 70 Mexican tourists, as well as some Canadian 
and  American travellers, regardless of their exposure to the virus.284 They also 
implemented intensive contact tracing, and fengxiao, a tightly monitored mea-
sure of movement restriction, which prevents college and university students, 
faculty and staff members from leaving their campuses.285 School classes were 
cancelled at the first hint of disease.286 Chinese officials justified these mea-
sures as being necessary to prevent “the fast spread of the new flu strain.”287 
Such measures were not without backlash: China faced harsh criticism from 
the international community, and who subsequently requested China’s ratio-
nale for adopting such measures under the ihr.288 China apologized for their 
non-compliance with the ihr and issued a formal apology to Mexico.289
Several states repeated the use of quarantines again during the 2014–2016 
Ebola outbreak.290 The ihr allows states to adopt quarantine measures in ac-
cordance with their national laws and other international laws “to the extent 
necessary to control [the imminent public health] risk”.291 The ihr does not 
set out level of “imminent public health risk” required for states to subject as-
ymptomatic travellers to quarantine orders or prescribe limits to the length of 
such quarantine orders.292 In addition, the ihr does not describe appropriate 
procedures for quarantine orders, including due process protections and ap-
peal routes.
In practice, given the principles underlying state derogations from human 
rights obligations, states should only adopt quarantine orders that are legiti-
mate, necessary, and proportionate to control the spread of infectious dis-
eases. They must also be of limited duration. Some may argue that China has 
284 James G Hodge Jr, ‘Global Legal Triage in Response to the 2009 H1N1 Outbreak’ (2010) 11(2) 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 599, 607; ‘The World Response to Flu Cri-
sis’, bbc (5 May 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8022516.stm>.
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not ratified the iccpr.293 Yet, even in the absence of this instrument, the IHR 
 rendered it incumbent on the government to show that its health measures 
were no more intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives that 
would achieve appropriate public health protection.
6.3 Restrictions applied to Goods
Despite a joint statement from who, fao, oie and wto stating that pork 
products cannot transmit the H1N1 virus,294 at least 20 countries, including 
China, Russia and the Republic of Korea banned or restricted pork imports 
from the United States, Canada and Mexico during the outbreak.295 American, 
Canadian and Mexican officials moved quickly to condemn these various 
restrictions.296
Countries that restricted trade during the H1N1 outbreak contravened 
 Article 43(2) of the ihr by failing to base their trade measures on the avail-
able scientific evidence as well as the available information from relevant/
competent international organizations (in this case, the who, fao, oie and 
wto). Moreover, as per the H1N1 Review Committee’s post-outbreak analysis, 
no country had voluntarily provided public health rationales for additional 
health measures implemented, 297 constituting a clear violation of the obliga-
tion under Article 43(3) to provide public health rationales for such measures.
Legality is less clear when health measures are applied on a purely national 
level. Egyptian authorities, for instance, ordered the mass slaughter of between 
250,000 and 400,000 pigs, despite no reported H1N1 outbreak in humans or pigs 
in the country.298 This health measure was applied at significant cost to local 
farmers who were not paid for their losses.299 The ihr prohibits the imposi-
tion of charges for health measures applied to travellers, but it remains silent 
on whether health measures resulting in losses to local populations would 
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The Washington Post (30 October 2018) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global 
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Answers’ (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009) 6 ; MacInnis, above 
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297 H1N1 Review Committee, above n 153, 80.
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similarly be impermissible.300 Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that such mea-
sures would be classified as being ‘commensurate with public health risks.’
7 Conclusion
The central purpose of the ihr is to balance a public health response to the 
international spread of disease while avoiding any unnecessary interference 
with international traffic and trade.301 This balancing exercise is especially ap-
parent in Article 43, which permits states to implement additional health mea-
sures in response to specific public health risks or pheics provided that such 
measures are, in the first instance: (1) in full respect for the dignity, human 
rights and fundamental freedom of persons; (2) in accordance with their na-
tional law and other relevant international obligations; (3) otherwise consis-
tent with the ihr; and (4) not more intrusive or invasive of persons, nor more 
restrictive of international traffic, than reasonably available alternatives that 
would achieve an appropriate level of health protection.
Having met these baseline criteria, states that seek to implement an addi-
tional health measure must further determine whether the measure is based 
on: (1) scientific principles; (2) scientific evidence, and where scientific evi-
dence is insufficient, available information including from the who and other 
competent intergovernmental organizations and international bodies; and 
(3) specific guidance or advice from the who. Two obligations are triggered for 
states that decide to implement an additional health measure: the obligation 
to report within 48 hours to the who the public health rationale and relevant 
scientific information underpinning an additional health measure that inter-
feres significantly with international traffic; and the obligation to review with-
in three months any additional health measure imposed in light of the science 
and the who advice.
As a legally binding instrument of international law, the provisions of the 
ihr aptly lend themselves to interpretation as per the general and supple-
mentary rules outlined in the Vienna Convention. We have demonstrated that, 
 beyond examining the ordinary meaning of Article 43, relevant sources of in-
terpretation per the Vienna Convention are (1) subsequent practice in the appli-
cation of Article 43 by parties and (2) other sources of international law which 
influence any understanding of the current text and offer further insight on the 
meaning of ambiguous terms.
300 ihr, above n 4, art 40.
301 Ibid art 1.
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Subsequent state practice, as observed through the actions taken by states 
during two controversial but retrospectively examined pheics, provides little 
assistance in identifying consensus among parties on the implementation of 
Article 43. The most that can be discerned from state practice is that most 
states follow most of the rules most of time. On the other hand, state practice, 
as expressed through consensus-building sessions and resolutions of the wha, 
reveals that the 196 parties to the ihr remain firmly committed to restricting 
the use of additional health measures to those instances where it is clearly 
warranted and scientifically justified and where it does not cause harm or dis-
proportionately impact affected populations.
It is clear the ihr was conceived to be closely intertwined with internation-
al human rights law and international trade law. With respect to human rights 
law, Article 43 sets limitations to additional health measures by deferring to 
the rights contained in the udhr, iccpr and other international and regional 
human rights treaties. This symbiosis suggests that in cases where an addition-
al health measure may curtail the rights and freedoms of individuals, states 
should at minimum apply the principles of legitimacy, necessity and propor-
tionality to guide them in understanding the limited circumstances under 
which they may legally deviate from their human rights obligations.
As a further relevant source of international law, decisions of the wto Panel 
and Appellate Body under gatt and the sps Agreement shed greater clarity 
on the scientific assessment, including the need for a rational relationship 
between the measure being implemented and the scientific principles and 
available scientific evidence cited to support them, while also creating space 
for scientific evidence which may be derived from minority or non- dominant 
scientific experts (though representing more than just opinion). The mea-
sure may be deemed necessary where it contributes substantially to a stated 
 objective – and ‘reasonably available’ alternatives to the measure may be iden-
tified if they practically serve the level of health protection chosen by a state 
(and are not simply alternatives ‘in theory’). Finally, a process of risk assess-
ment is not merely a formality; states can err on the side of caution during 
risk assessment, but the exercise of risk assessment itself – prescribed in paral-
lel by  Article 43(2)(b) of the ihr – must be undertaken and must withstand 
 scientific scrutiny.
The world’s capacity to respond to public health crises like the covid-19 
pandemic depends on having clear and established rules, and assuring compli-
ance with them. The ihr’s Article 43 is an important provision in an important 
international legal instrument. Yet recent experience highlights that too many 
states violate it, putting global health at risk and undermining the global gover-
nance system by which the world manages public health risks. Given  apparent 
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ambiguities and past misinterpretations, we believe that clarity on what Ar-
ticle 43 requires is a helpful starting point for promoting greater compliance 
with the ihr. This consensus statement, which aimed to provide such clarity, 
should be useful in guiding legal state responses to public health risks and in 
holding states accountable for doing so. Any dissatisfaction with Article 43’s 
requirements will need to be addressed by states through negotiation of a revi-
sion or subsequent agreement to the ihr.
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